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ARTICLES

PURSUING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES
AFTER CONFLICT: WHAT IMPACT ON BUILDING

THE RULE OF LAW?
BYJANE E. STROMSETH*
INTRODUCTION

In countries ravaged by widespread violence, the trauma does not
end when the guns fall silent. On the contrary, atrocities have cast a
long shadow in places such as the Balkans, where brutal massacres,
mass rapes, and ethnic cleansing were regular features of war; in
Rwanda, where a devastating genocide killed hundreds of thousands of
people; and in Sierra Leone, where the civil war was marked by forced
recruitment of child soldiers, rapes and murders, and the gruesome
mutilation of civilians. In Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor, and many
other societies, severe abuses have also left deep pain and trauma in
their wake.
States that attempt to end periods of bloodly conflict by intervention
often focus on reestablishing security, reconstructing governance institutions, and reforming the justice system. While such efforts are crucial
for promoting the rule of law, they are rarely sufficient to grapple with
the complex legacy of past abuses. As a result, unless leaders in war-torn
societies confront the difficult issue of accountability for past atrocities,
they run the risk that new structures of law will be built upon shaky
foundations.
Although nothing can undo the suffering of those who have endured
violent abuse, ensuring that perpetrators of atrocities face some reckoning can be critical to moving forward on both an individual and
community level in societies recovering from violent conflict. Ensuring
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some measure of accountability may help victims come to terms with
the past and can also help signal to all members of post-conflict
societies that, henceforth, such abuses will not be permitted to recur.
Just as important, the process of pursuing accountability for atrocities
can reinforce broader efforts to reform the justice system.
All this is far more easily said than done, however. In the wake of
violent conflicts, national justice systems, if they function effectively at
all, usually have only limited ability to render fair justice. Indeed, in
many post-conflict societies, citizens view existing legal institutions
skeptically because of corruption, systematic bias, association with
abusive past regimes, failure to effectively address past grievances, or
severe shortfalls in human and other resources. Moreover, those who
have committed atrocities may still wield political power or exert
influence behind the scenes. Even when criminal trials are initiated
against perpetrators, those facing trial and their political allies may view
the proceedings as illegitimate forms of "victor's justice." In some
situations, accountability mechanisms may actually trigger further violence.
Meanwhile, it is not always clear how victims can best be served.
Although some victims demand trial and punishment of perpetrators,
others place greater emphasis on public acknowledgement of their
suffering and on reparations or some tangible form of assistance. In
such complex situations, both international interveners and domestic
leaders-confronted by limited resources and other urgent reconstruction challenges-inevitably must struggle to balance justice, reconciliation, and other compelling goals.
Yet the fundamental issue of accountability-and its relationship to
the rule of law-cannot be ignored. Establishing a credible and
functioning justice system that serves the goals of the rule of law is
central to moving forward after violent conflict. Even more fundamentally, strengthening the rule of law depends on building people's
confidence that they will be protected from predatory state and nonstate actors, that they can resolve disagreements fairly and reliably
without resorting to violence, and that legal and political institutions
will protect rather than violate basic human rights. Only then is the rule
of law likely to take root: a state of affairs in which most people, most of
the time, choose to resolve disputes in a manner that is consistent with
fair rules and fundamental human rights norms, in which modem legal
institutions and laws exist, and there is a widely-shared cultural and
political commitment to the values underlying those institutions and
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laws. 1
This Article explores a critically important question: can the pursuit
of accountability for atrocities through criminal prosecutions and
other supplementary methods help to build the rule of law and
strengthen justice systems in post-conflict societies? At a broad level,
this question has divided scholars and practitioners alike.
Advocates of a rights-based approachargue that major perpetrators of
atrocities must be held legally accountable if a country is to make an
effective transition to a society marked by the rule of law. Proponents of
this approach see legal impunity as the biggest barrier to sustainable
peace and argue that vigorous prosecution of at least major offenders is
the only real way to remove the stain of impunity from traumatized
societies. Fair trials affirm that atrocities are wrong and unacceptabledrawing a clear line for all to see-and incarceration both prevents the
guilty from repeat offenses and potentially serves as a deterrent to
others.2 Trials can also give victims a sense of justice that helps them
move forward without a need to seek personal vengeance. Truth
commissions can supplement trials and acknowledge more fully the
truth of what occurred and the pain and needs of victims, potentially
contributing to reconciliation over time.3 Even if accountability efforts
are inevitably imperfect responses to the suffering caused by atrocities,
they can symbolize a society's desire to confront its past, to reject
patterns of impunity, and to move in a new direction.
An alternative, realistview disputes the beneficial impacts of trials and
argues instead that criminal prosecution of major perpetrators can be
destabilizing. Realists argue that conditional amnesties may be necessary to remove "spoilers" and thus help create a better prospect for
peace and long-term development of the rule of law. Once political

bargains are struck among contending groups, they argue, "institutions

1. SeeJANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN, & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING
THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS (Cambridge University Press 2006) [hereinafter
CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?], for a discussion of this definition of the rule of law and the many
challenges in advancing it.
2. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Accountabilityfor Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw
and Other Serious Violations of Human Rights, in POST-CONLICTrJUSTcE 3, 4, 54 (M. Cherif Bassiouni

ed., 2002).
3. For an extremely thoughtful discussion of truth commissions, see PRISCILIA B. HAYNER,
UNSPEAKABLE TRtUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATRocrY (2001). Recently, in both East
Timor and Sierra Leone, truth commissions sought to contribute to reconciliation through
community-based reconciliation procedures, which are examined in this Article in Sections IV.C
and V.E below.
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based on the rule of law become more feasible." 4 Pursuing accountability without establishing "political and institutional preconditions," they
contend, "risks weakening norms ofjustice by revealing their ineffectiveness and hindering necessary political bargaining. " '
Neither camp is without its vulnerabilities. If some proponents of the
rights-based approach are at times too starry-eyed about the practical
benefits of trials and truth commissions or sometimes unpragmatic in
acknowledging political and other constraints, the realists are prone to
overstate the downsides of prosecution by focusing on the perspectives
of self-interested ruling elites rather than on broader segments of
post-conflict societies, including victims and civil society organizations.
The realists also tend to overstate the practical benefits of amnesties.
Even if high-ranking individuals are given amnesty as the price for
peace, there is no assurance that the amnesty will in fact be sufficient to
sustain peace. In Sierra Leone, for instance, the amnesty given to
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces and other groups in the 1999
Lome Agreement did not stop the conflict, rooted in greed and
self-interest, from continuing. 6 A British-led international intervention
was necessary. Realist critics also understate the degree of innovation
and pragmatism reflected in more recent efforts to link accountability
for past atrocities to forward-looking reforms.
Trends on the ground are, to some degree, overtaking this broad

4. Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of
InternationalJustice, 28 INT'L SECURITY, Winter 2003/04, at 5, 6. Snyder and Vinjamuri argue that
"UJ]ustice does not lead; it follows... [and] a norm-governed political order must be based on a
political bargain among contending groups and on the creation of robust administrative institutions that can predictably enforce the law." Id. Although they "agree that the ultimate goal is to
prevent atrocities by effectively institutionalizing appropriate standards of criminal justice," they
argue that "the initial steps toward that goal must usually travel down the path of political
expediency." Id. at 6-7.
5. Id,at 6.
6. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone,July 7,1999, U.N. Doc. S/1999/777, availableathttp://www.sierra-leone.org/
lomeaccord.html [hereinafter Lome Accord]. Article IX of the agreement provided that "[i]n
order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the Government of Sierra Leone shall take
appropriate legal steps to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon." Id. That article
also provided for the Government of Sierra Leone to "grant absolute and free pardon and
reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of
their objectives, up to the time of the signing" of the Lome Agreement. Id. In addition, "the
Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against any
member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect of anything done by them in pursuit
of their objectives as members of those organizations, since March 1991, up to the time of the
signing of the present Agreement." Id.
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theoretical debate. Advocates of the rights-based approach increasingly
have recognized the need to supplement trials with noncriminal accountability mechanisms that offer alternatives to trials for lesser
offenders. The community reconciliation process in East Timor (now
Timor Leste) is one recent example. 7 Furthermore, the normative
acceptability of amnesties for serious offenses is more contested today,
both internationally and domestically. 8 In Afghanistan, for instance,
amnesty provisions proposed by the Northern Alliance were not included in the Bonn Agreement, and a majority of Afghans surveyed

oppose amnesties for serious offenses. 9 Furthermore, devising amnesty
arrangements that effectively remove spoilers and genuinely help to
create conditions for strengthening the rule of law-rather than just
permitting impunity-is enormously difficult in practice.
Nevertheless, the realists have an important point. Moving forward
after atrocities does require a clear-eyed assessment of the underlying
forces that impede stability and reform. Holding key perpetrators
criminally accountable- especially before international tribunals miles
away-may advance international standards ofjustice. However, it may

7. Upon attaining independence in May 2002, East Timor became the Democratic Republic
of Timor Leste. Because this article refers to multiple time periods, pre- and post-independence,
the term East Timor is used for ease of reference, but Timor Leste is the country's preferred
English name today. The community-based reconciliation procedures developed by the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation are discussed in detail in its report. Chega!: Final
Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (2005) [hereinafter
Chega!: Final Report of the CAVR], available at http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/ ("Chega!" means
"Enough!" in Portuguese).
8. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Rule of Law and Transitional
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 1 10, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/
616 (Aug. 3, 2004) ("United Nations-endorsed peace agreements can never promise amnesties for
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human ights.... ."); Charles
T. Call, Conclusionto CONSTRUCTINGJUSTICE AND SECuIrry AFTER WAR (Charles T. Call, ed., 2006).
9. SeeAFGHAN INDEPENDENT HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, A CALL FORJUSTICE: A NATIONAL CONSULTATION ON PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN 21, 41-43 (2005) [hereinafter A CALL
FOR JUSTICE], available at http://www.aihrc.org.af/repEng_29_01_05.htm (noting that views
varied regionally, but that 60.5% overall of those surveyed rejected the idea of "amnesties or
pardons for anyone who confessed their crimes before an institution created for transitional
justice."). As the report explains, the Bonn Agreement "affirms accountability as a principle" but
provides for no particular mechanisms. Id. at 42-43. Although an amnesty provision proposed by
the Northern Alliance was not adopted, a clause prohibiting amnesty for war crimes and crimes
against humanity supported by the United Nations "was deleted." Id. In December 2005, the
Afghan government affirmed that "no amnesty will be granted for gross violations of human
rights." Press Release, Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, Truth-seeking and
Reconciliation in Afghanistan (Dec. 15, 2005), at 2. Subsequently, in March 2007, the government
adopted a controversial amnesty law, which is discussed in Part V.B. of this Article.
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simultaneously have very little, if any, impact on strengthening the
domestic rule of law in a post-conflict society. Just as we cannot assume
that such trials will be destabilizing domestically, or that amnesties will
effectively neutralize spoilers and clear the way for genuine reform,
neither can we assume a positive spillover effect on the building of
domestic rule of law from criminal trials.
Indeed, the question of whether and how accountability proceedings
can contribute to strengthening domestic justice systems and to building the rule of law in post-conflict societies is surprisingly underanalyzed.' ° For too long, the practical division of the fields of "transitional
justice" and "rule of law reform" into two largely separate communities
of scholars and practitioners has impeded efforts to explore systematically how accountability processes might, concretely, contribute to
forward-looking rule of law reforms."' If this gap can be overcome,
opportunities for valuable synergies between accountability efforts and
rule of law reform programs can be pursued more effectively. To be
sure, we are relatively early in the process of understanding the
longer-term impacts of accountability processes-such as criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reconciliation proceedings, vetting-in
different post-conflict societies; furthermore, the unique circumstances and obstacles in each society attempting to overcome horrific
atrocities make generalizations risky. Still, more systematic thinking
and empirical research on the impact of accountability proceedings in
specific post-conflict societies is a critical need and an increasingly
important area of inquiry.12

10. Scholars advocating a variety of approaches to accountability acknowledge that we need
more systematic analysis of the impact of accountability proceedings on strengthening the rule of
law prospectively. For a helpful recent effort to explore the potential impact of accountability
efforts on forward-looking justice reform, see CHARLES T. CALL, Introduction and Conclusion to
CONSTRUCTINGJUSTICE AND SECURITY AFrER WAR, supranote 8.
11. One scholar and practitioner who spans both fields and has worked hard to bring them
together is Neil Kritz of the U.S. Institute of Peace. See, e.g., Neil J. Kritz, The Rule of Law in the
Postconflict Phase: Building a Stable Peace, in TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGE OF MANAGING

INTERNATIONAL CoNFIucr 801 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2001); Neil J. Kritz, Progress and
Humility: The Ongoing Searchfor Post-ConflictJustice, in POST-CONFICT JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 55,
84-87.
12. For thoughtful recent assessments of East Timor's community reconciliation proceedings, for example, see SPENCER ZIFCAK, THE ASIA FOUNDATION, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN EAST
TIMOR: AN EVALUATION OF THE COMMUNITY RECONCILIATION PROCESS OF THE CAVR (2004); U.N.
Dev. Programme [UNDP], The Community Reconciliation Process of the Commissionfor Reception,
Truth, and Reconciliation (April, 2004) (prepared by Piers Pigou) [hereinafter Community
Reconciliation Process], available at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Reports/otherresources/

UNDPReportOnCRP%5B1%5D.pdf.
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This Article aims to clarify what we know-and do not know-about
the impact of accountability processes on domestic justice systems and
the rule of law in post-intervention societies. By looking backward and
forward at the same time, the Article aims to explore systematically the
relationships, if any, between retrospective accountability proceedings
and prospective domestic capacity-building and reform. Before examining the experiences in a number of post-conflict societies, Part I
considers some of the broad trends that have influenced choices made
in these situations regarding particular accountability mechanisms and
goals. Part II offers a theory about how accountability processes may
contribute to building the rule of law in post-conflict societies through
their demonstration and capacity-building effects.
The remaining parts examine the empirical record. Part III looks at
the domestic impacts of the international tribunals for former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. Part IV examines the hybrid national/international tribunals in Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, and their
effects on the domestic rule of law, along with the role of the truth and
reconciliation commissions in East Timor and Sierra Leone. Finally,
Part V looks at some domestic approaches to accountability, including
trials before Iraq's special tribunal for crimes against humanity and
prospects for accountability in Afghanistan, along with the potential
impact of the International Criminal Court.
The Article argues that the long-term impact of accountability proceedings on the rule of law depends critically on three factors: first, the
effective disempowerment of key perpetrators who threaten stability
and undermine public confidence in the rule of law; second, the
character of the accountability proceedings pursued, particularly
whether they demonstrate credibly that previous patterns of abuse and
impunity are rejected and thatjustice can be fair; and third, the extent
to which systematic and meaningful efforts at domestic capacitybuilding are included as part of the accountability process. In a number
of countries studied here, criminal trials have not been as influential as
advocates had hoped and seem to have had little impact at all on
forward-looking efforts to strengthen justice systems and the rule of
law. But in other cases, accountability processes-particularly those
located within affected countries that enjoy considerable public support and engage in systematic outreach-are contributing to national
capacity-building and may be reinforcing both domestic expectations
of accountability and demands for fairerjustice processes in the future.
This Article identifies some of the features of the more effective
processes, such as Sierra Leone's Special Court and East Timor's
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, but also acknowl2007]
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edges their limitations and emphasizes the challenge of sustaining
their impact and legacy.
First, however, some essential background is needed both on broad
trends in efforts to seek accountability for atrocities since the 1990s and
on key goals and specific mechanisms that have been pursued in
different cases.
I.

"TRANSITIONALJUSTICE" IN EVOLUTION: THE ACCOUNTABILITY LEARNING
CURVE

When international and local leaders pursue accountability for
atrocities, they have many goals in mind beyond contributing to
domestic legal reform.1 3 Bringing major perpetrators to justicedemonstrating that their conduct is wrong and unacceptable-is an
immediate and fundamental goal. Prosecuting and punishing major
offenders affirms and reinforces the core international legal rules
prohibiting genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.' 4
Holding individual perpetrators legally accountable can also provide
some sense of justice and relief to victims and their families and
potentially help to defuse grievances and curtail cycles of vengeance.
Prosecution of major offenders may help to deter future perpetrators by setting an example and making clear that wrong-doers will be
held accountable. As such, prosecutions can be a central part of a
larger effort to strengthen and to begin institutionalizing normative
commitments to accountability-rather than impunity-in. postconflict societies. But accountability proceedings alone cannot claim
too much with respect to preventing future atrocities. Because prosecutions inevitably are selective and because many factors contribute to
individual decisions to commit atrocities, the issue of deterring future

13. SeeJane E. Stromseth, Introduction: Goals and Challenges in the Pursuitof Accountability,
in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 1, 5-13 (Jane E.

Stromseth ed., 2003). For analysis of accountability goals, methods, and concrete experiences, see,
e.g., POST-CoNFLcr JUSTICE, supra note 2; HAYNER, supra note 3; MARTHA MINOw, BETWEEN
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER MASS VIOLENCE (1998); STEVEN R. RATNER &

JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND

(2nd ed. 2001); Miriam J. Aukerman, ExtraordinaryEvil, Ordinary Crime: A
Frameworkfor UnderstandingTransitionalJustice, 15 HAiv. Hum. RTS.J. 39 (2002); David A. Crocker,
Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework, 13 ETHICS & INT'L AFt. 43 (1999); NeilJ. Kritz,
Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human
Rights, 59 LAw & CONTEMp. PROBS. 127 (1996).
14. See generally RATNER & ABRAMS, supranote 13; Bassiouni, supra note 2.
THE NUREMBERG LEGACY
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abuses is a complex and often uncertain matter. 15 The selective,
focused nature of criminal trials after massive atrocities also limits them
as mechanisms for achieving a number of broad goals, such as a
comprehensive account of a conflict and its causes.
In contrast, truth commissions are more likely to be effective in
compiling a comprehensive "truth" that addresses the larger context of
a conflict and provides a fuller account of the factors contributing to
atrocities. Truth commissions can provide a greater opportunity for
direct participation by a larger number of victims and may also-as in
East Timor and Sierra Leone-seek to promote reconciliation and
reintegration of lesser perpetrators into the community through reconciliation agreements and rituals. Unlike trials, truth commissions can
make far-reaching policy recommendations, and they may be better
able to advance goals of "restorative" or "reparative"justice by focusing
directly on the concrete needs of victims.1

6

Sierra Leone's Truth and

Reconciliation Commission, for instance, has recommended free health
care and education for amputees, victims of sexual violence, and others
injured by the conflict.1 7 East Timor's Commission for Reception,
Truth and Reconciliation likewise has proposed an ambitious reparations program (calling on Indonesia and other
states to contribute), as
18
reforms.
innovative
of
array
well as a broad
No single mechanism or approach can satisfy the many-sometimes
conflicting-goals ofjustice, truth, prevention and deterrence, reconciliation, and domestic capacity-building in the aftermath of severe
atrocities. Recognition of this fact has contributed to several emergent
trends intended to approach accountability efforts in new ways to
increase their effectiveness in helping recovering states strengthen the
rule of law.
One significant recent trend is toward "mixed" approaches to account-

15. On the difficulties of deterrence, see David Wippman,Atrocitie, Detrrence,and theLimits of
InternationalJustice, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 473 (1999); David Wippman, Exaggerating the ICC, in
BRINGING POWER TO JUSTICE: THE PROSPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 99 (Joanna
Harrington ed.,

2005);

GARYJONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR

CRIMES TRIBUNALS 290-95 (2000); Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal

JusticePreventFutureAtrocities,95 AM.J. INT'L L. 7 (2001).
16. For a thoughtful discussion of reparative justice, see RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION:
SEEKINGJUSTICE IN THE SHADOW OF WAR 173-78 (2002).
17. 1 TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, SIERRA LEONE, WITNESS TO TRUTH: REPORT OF THE
SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, intro., para. 51 (2004) [hereinafter WITNESS
TO TRUTH], available at http://www.trcsierraleone.org/pdf/FINAL%20VOLUME%200NE/
VOLUME%20ONE.pdf.
18. See Chega!: FinalReport of the CAVR, supranote 7, pt. 11.
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ability that combine multiple mechanisms designed to advance a
number of different goals. These mechanisms may include criminal
prosecutions as well as truth commissions, reconciliation procedures
for lesser offenders, and vetting (restrictions on access to government
positions), for instance. Generally, the more deeply rooted the causes
of atrocities, the more pressures accountability processes will face to
not only be the arbiter of justice in specific cases but also an agent for
achieving more systemic social change.
A second trend in transitional justice is to move away from remotely
located international tribunals toward hybrid courts with national
participation situated directly in affected countries. In both East Timor
and Sierra Leone, for instance, defendants have been prosecuted for
war crimes and crimes against humanity before mixed panels of
national and international judges, with the prosecutorial staff likewise
composed of international and national lawyers. Although purely
international tribunals may sometimes be necessary, international
courts-like the international criminal tribunals for former Yugoslavia
and for Rwanda-are physically and often psychologically distant from
the people most affected by the atrocities they are prosecuting; also,
these tribunals are not designed to contribute resources or training
directly to the domestic justice system. In contrast, hybrid tribunals
located within post-conflict societies may be viewed as more legitimate
by domestic audiences, have greater potential for domestic capacitybuilding by involving domestic jurists directly in the work of the court,
and may be better able to demonstrate the importance of accountability and fair justice to local populations. 19 These potential benefits, in
theory at least, have contributed to the trend toward hybrid arrangements, a trend that may well 0 continue even with the arrival of the
2
International Criminal Court.
A third, and overdue, trend is a more systematic effort to understand
the specific goals and priorities of domestic populations who, after all,
are the people who endured the atrocities and must chart a new future.
The question of how best to face the past-and what forms of accountability to pursue-is a difficult one, and different societies ultimately
may have quite different goals and priorities. Within those societies,
moreover, various actors and groups may disagree quite strongly over
priorities. In East Timor, for example, President Xanana Gusmao has

19. See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promiseof Hybrid Courts, 97 AM.J. INT'L L. 295 (2003).
20. SeeJenia Iontcheva Turner, NationalizingInternationalCriminalLaw, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1
(2005); Stromseth, supra note 13, at 1, 32.
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long stressed the importance of reconciliation and forward-looking
social justice, whereas others (including the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in its report) also emphasize the continuing importance of criminal prosecution of major offenders.
Moreover, international actors have their own priorities. Even when
international commitment to accountability is reasonably strong, which
it sometimes is not, international actors may not give sufficient attention to the concrete problems and obstacles to achieving meaningful
accountability in specific post-conflict countries. Domestic leaders
often perceive international leaders and donors as more concerned
about sending a general deterrent message regarding atrocities than
about the specific, long-term needs of the particular post-conflict
society directly involved. 21 Yet these needs, as well as the often deepseated grievances, inequalities, and systemic problems that contribute
to violence and instability, must be addressed if a stable rule of law is to
take root.
The growing recognition of the importance of understanding local
goals and priorities is evident in Afghanistan. With international support, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)
conducted a countrywide survey and series of 200 focus groups to
determine the priorities of the Afghan people regarding accountability. In its report, A CallforJustice,the AIHRC documents overwhelming
Afghan support for removing from power those who committed serious
abuses during Afghanistan's long years of conflict, many of whom
continue to wield power today.2 2 Strong public support for criminal
trials for the most serious offenders is accompanied by widespread
support for vetting and removing other offenders from power. Afghans, though generally unfamiliar with "truth commissions" as such,
also expressed a strong desire for some truth-seeking mechanism as
well as deep support for "reparations" or compensation to those victims
most in need. Afghans also expressed strong preferences for conducting criminal trials in Afghanistan, rather than outside the country, and
for a hybrid tribunal that includes Afghan as well as international jurists.
This impressive effort to understand what the people of Afghanistan want
holds out the potential for tailoring accountability processes to fulfill deep
domestic aspirations. But, whether these aspirations will in fact be realized
remains an open question fraught with obstacles, as discussed below.

21. See, e.g.,Jason Strain & Elizabeth Keyes, Accountability in the Aflermath of Rwanda's Genocide,
in AccounTrABITry FOR ATROCIES, supranote 13, at 98-99, 130.
22. A CALL FORJUSTICE, supra note 9, passim.

2007]

GEORGETOWNJOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW
II.

THE CHALLENGE OF DEMONSTRATING AND INSTITUTIONALIZING

ACCOUNTABILITY NoRMs

The trends discussed above not only underscore the need for multifaceted accountability procedures but also signify a growing determination on the part of both international and domestic actors to leave
behind a continuing legacy of facilities, skills, and new habits of
thought and practice when accountability proceedings conclude. But
the impact of different accountability initiatives on strengthening the
domestic rule of law in post-conflict societies is not straightforward.
Much depends on how accountability processes are conducted, the
uncertainties of unintended consequences, and the extent to which
local perceptions ofjustice are altered by the proceedings. The potentially salutary impacts of accountability proceedings fall into at least two
categories: their demonstration effects and their capacity-building
effects. This Article will consider each in turn.
A.

DemonstrationEffects

Accountability proceedings can contribute to strengthening the rule
of law in post-conflict societies through their demonstrationeffects.23 Most
tangibly and directly, by removing perpetrators of atrocities from
positions in which they can control and abuse others, criminal trials
(and processes such as rigorous vetting) can have a cathartic impact by
assuring the population that old patterns of impunity and exploitation
are no longer tolerated. Barring known perpetrators from committing
new atrocities and delegitimizing them in the eyes of the public helps
to both break patterns of rule by fear and build public confidence that
justice can be fair. Many Afghans, for instance, have made clear that
their trust injustice and in government institutions depends on removing serious abusers from positions of power and that they view this as
24
essential for, not contrary to, security and long-term stability.

23. The idea of "demonstration effects" has been discussed by others as well. See INT'L CrR.
FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE & U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, THE "LEGACY" OF THE SPECIAL COURT

FOR SIERRA LEONE 12 (2003), http://www.ictj.org/downloads/LegacyReport.pdf. This Article aims
to develop the concept and amplify the ways in which accountability proceedings can have positive
demonstration effects on building the rule of law in post-conflict societies. For an interesting
analysis of the "political effects" of criminal tribunals, including their impact in delegitimizing
offenders and their possible stabilizing or destabilizing effects, see WILLIAM W. BURKE-WHITE, A
SYSTEM OF MULTILEVEL GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW,

ch. IV (forthcoming).
24. A CALL FORJUSTICE, supranote 9, at 17, 41-44.
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Such cathartic processes can, nevertheless, be wrenching and traumatic in the near term. As powerful figures and their allies see their
authority slip away, they may choose to mount resistance, which can
aggravate existing instabilities. Also, in circumstances where vetting
processes have been extensive-if inconsistent, as in Iraq-there is a
risk that so many individuals may be removed from their positions that
it undermines the stability of existing institutions or prospects for
building new ones in a timely manner.
In addition to disempowering perpetrators, the demonstration effects of accountability processes depend on their character and credibility. Accountability proceedings-particularly trials but also truth commissions-aim to demonstrate that atrocities are unacceptable,
condemned, and not to be repeated. They aim to substantiate concretely, and to demonstrate, a norm of accountability. If the proceedings that lead to conviction for major offenses-or the reconciliation
rituals for lesser offenses-are widely viewed as fair and legitimate, they
are more likely to demonstrate credibly that previous patterns of
impunity have been rejected, that law can be fair, and that political
position or economic clout does not immunize a person from accountability. If a norm of accountability is demonstrated credibly, it may
provide meaningful justice to victims, reducing the chances of personal
vengeance-seeking and eliminating impunity as a source of grievance
more broadly. Providing a model of fair justice-through fair criminal
prosecutions or through balanced reconciliation agreements for lesser
offenders, for instance-can give citizens legitimate reason to expect
(and to demand) better accountability and fairer processes in the
future in other areas of life as well.
Of course, if accountability proceedings are widely viewed as biased,
or if big fish go free while much lesser offenders are held accountable,
those proceedings may have negative, counterproductive demonstration effects. They may send a message that justice is not fair, that
previous patterns of impunity are continuing, and that deep-seated
grievances will not be addressed. The complete failure to pursue
accountability at all can send a similar message. In Afghanistan, for
example, impunity is still rampant in those parts of the country where
regional commanders and warlords function as a law unto themselves.
Accountability for current abuses is probably of greater immediate
concern for many Afghans than accountability for the past, but the two
are clearly related when, in many instances, warlords who grew accustomed to operating with impunity in the past brazenly continue to do
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2
so in the present. 5
Pursuing accountability fairly and credibly can have empowering ripple
effects in a post-conflict society. By putting the issue of accountability on
the national agenda, credible accountability proceedings can be a focal
point for local and international nongovernmental organizations who
advocate for related domestic reforms. Interveners involved in accountability proceedings can stress the importance of accountability norms
to local elites generally, 26 and local and international NGOs can
magnify these effects both by working to inform and empower ordinary
citizens about the importance of accountability and fair justice and by
keeping pressure on post-conflict governments.2 7 To effectively
strengthen the domestic rule of law in the long term, accountability
proceedings must demonstrate the value and importance of accountability and fair justice to local leaders and ordinary citizens alike:
positive domestic change
is more likely if pressure can be applied both
28

from above and below.

Accountability proceedings, in short, can strengthen the fabric of a
post-conflict society by helping to build and spread domestic support
for a norm of accountability. As political scientists have argued, at some
point in the development of a new norm, a "tipping point" is reached
where the norm, enjoying broad acceptance, "cascades" through a

25. On the problem of impunity in Afghanistan, see RAMA MANI, AFGHANISTAN RESEARCH &
EVALUATION UNIT, ENDING IMPUNrIY AND BUILDING JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN (2003); A CALL FOR

supra note 9, at 17 ("Many persons who committed gross human rights violations remain
inpower today. This has provoked a profound disappointment in Afghans together with an almost
total breakdown of trust in authority and public institutions.").
26. For a helpful general discussion of the importance of socializing elites in achieving norm
change, see G.John Ikenberry & Charles A. Kupchan, Socialization and Hegemonic Power, 44 INT'L
ORG. 283 (1990).
27. Political scientists have developed various models of norm diffusion and human rights
advocacy. These include a "spiral model" through which local and international NGOs put
pressure on domestic governments-from above and below-to abide by human rights principles,
and a process of"norm cascades" as values gain credence broadly through a society after reaching
a certain "tipping point." See Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International

JUSTICE,

Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices,in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS

AND Dom sIc CHANGE 1-38 (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, & Kathryn Sikkink, eds., 1999)
(describing the spiral model); Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, InternationalNorm Dynamics
and PoliticalChange,52 INT'L ORG. 887, 901 (1998) (norm cascades).
28. This analysis is consistent with Risse and Sikkink's "spiral model." Risse & Sikkink, supra
note 27, at 1. On the critical importance of socializing elites, see Ikenberry & Kupchan, supra note
26. On the importance of empowering citizens, especially the poor, in building the rule of law, see
Stephen Golub, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment Alternative (Carnegie

Endowment for Int'l Peace, Democracy & Rule of Law Project, Rule of Law Series, No. 41, 2003),
available at http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/wp41.pdf.
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society. 29 Before this point is reached, active efforts at persuasion by
norm advocates, including local and international NGOs, are essential.
Accountability proceedings can serve as a focal point for these efforts.
Indeed, building toward an accountability cascade-in which expectations of accountability become the norm-is critical to overcome the
legacy of a previous and pervasive impunity cascade in which order and
accountability simply broke down (an example of an impunity cascade
is Sierra Leone's situation in 1991, when many factors together tipped
the country toward violence with impunity) . 3 0 The slow and enormously hard work of building new normative expectations of accountability-rooted in a real capacity to deliver it, at least at a basic level-is
often the key to establishing a viable domestic rule of law after conflict.
The demonstration effect of accountability proceedings can be an
essential, though not sufficient, component of that long-term effort.
B.

Capacity-BuildingEffects

A second, related way that accountability proceedings can influence
development of the rule of law domestically is through concrete
capacity-building. Accountability proceedings cannot simply be an
"aside"-standing totally apart from ordinary and ongoing processes of
reform. Instead, over time, accountability norms-the condemnation
of brutal atrocities, the importance of fair proceedings for determining
responsibility, and the need for effective and impartial procedures for
resolving future disputes more generally-must become embedded in
domestic practices. Some accountability mechanisms, by virtue of their
location and degree of local participation, can help build domestic
capacity directly by increasing the skills and experience of local professionals and through outreach efforts designed to educate and em-

29. See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 27, at 895-909.
30. Sierra Leone's Truth and Reconciliation Commission has argued as follows:
While there were many factors, both internal and external, that explain the cause of the
civil war, the Commission came to the conclusion that it was years of bad governance,
endemic corruption and the denial of basic human rights that created the deplorable
conditions that made the conflict inevitable. Successive regimes became increasingly
impervious to the wishes and needs of the majority .... Government accountability was
nonexistent. Political expression and dissent had been crushed. Democracy and the
rule of law were dead. By 1991, Sierra Leone was a deeply divided society and full of the
potential for violence. It required only the slightest spark for this violence to be ignited.
WrNESS TO TRUTH, supra note 17, vol. 1, intro., para. 11.
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power citizens and civil society organizations more broadly. International tribunals can serve important goals-such as providing justice
for victims and conveying a strong international statement about
fundamental international principles, including due process-even if
their domestic impact in post-conflict societies is less clear. But unless
norms of accountability are institutionalizeddomestically in a sustainable
manner by strengthening national legal institutions and encouraging
fairer processes and greater substantive accountability more broadly,
the longer-term impact of accountability proceedings for past atrocities
is likely to be uncertain.
Even though accountability proceedings can contribute to such
domestic capacity-building, they also can compete with and divert
resources from domestic legal systems. Prosecutions for serious violations of international humanitarian law are complex, costly, and time
consuming. Competing priorities-for example, between international
and domestic actors-can generate sharp tensions. In Rwanda, for
instance, the government and ordinary citizens alike resent the millions of dollars spent on the international tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania,
while Rwanda's own domestic legal system languishes, desperately in
need of aid. Even when hybrid courts are established, as in Sierra
Leone and East Timor, the contrast between the facilities and resources
of war crimes tribunals and the regular justice system is stark and
sobering. The long-term needs of "ordinary" justice institutions generally cry out for attention, while international funding typically flows
more generously to the more dramatic accountability proceedings.
This potential tension highlights the need to think more systematically from the start about designing processes that can both advance
fundamental goals of accountability and develop domestic capacity for
fairjustice. Criminal trials, of course, must focus on their core purpose
of bringing individual perpetrators to justice in fair and impartial
proceedings. But modest efforts to enhance their domestic rule of law
impact (for example, through early and well-planned outreach to local
populations explaining the proceedings and the principles underlying
them) can potentially make a real difference.
Based on the framework outlined here, one would expect that
international trials held far from the people most affected by atrocitiesand lacking in any direct domestic capacity-building or outreach
efforts-are unlikely to have a substantial impact on strengthening the
domestic rule of law in post-conflict societies. Even if they prosecute
and thereby remove major perpetrators from domestic power structures, these trials must also be seen domestically to be doing justice if
they are to have positive demonstration effects. Hybrid tribunals or
[Vol. 38
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truth commissions located in the affected country-with strong domestic participation and outreach-are more likely to leave a tangible
legacy, at least if the bulk of the population views them as legitimate
and fair. Either approach will have a limited long-term impact, however, if strategic efforts at domestic capacity-building are never undertaken or if underlying domestic conflicts (whether ethnic tensions or
deep-seated perceived injustices) are simply left to fester or are even
exacerbated by proceedings regarded as biased.
But what more specific conclusions can be drawn, from recent
experience, regarding the impact of accountability proceedings on
building the rule of law domestically? It is to this challenging question
that we now turn.
III.

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOMESTIC RULE OF

LAw: THE ICTY AND THE ICTR
The international community had good reason to establish special
international tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Both conflicts involved egregious and widespread violations of international humanitarian law, and many states were determined to convey an emphatic
international message that such conduct was unacceptable. In neither
case were domestic legal systems in a position to provide fair and
impartialjustice. The Balkans were in the throes of a bitter conflict, and
violence and ethnic hostilities precluded chances of fair and unbiased
domestic prosecutions. Rwanda's legal system was devastated and overwhelmed in the face of massive genocide. The risks of "victor's justice"
in both situations were substantial. Under these circumstances, international tribunals held out a better prospect of independent and impartial proceedings and of gaining custody over perpetrators beyond
national borders.3 1
Established by the UN Security Council and funded largely by
member states, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) 3 2 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) 33 both have accomplished a great deal. They have each brought
to justice, in fair trials, at least some of the individuals most responsible

31. See, e.g., Kritz, The Rule of Law in the PostconflictPhase, supranote 11, at 816.

32. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); see International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTYat a Glance, General Information, http://www.un.org/icty/glancee/index.htm (follow "General Information" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 3, 2007) [hereinafter
IClY at a Glance].
33. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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for egregious atrocities. Rwanda's former prime minister, Jean Kambanda, for instance, pled guilty and was convicted of genocide before
the ICTR and is serving a life sentence.34 At the ICTY, General Radislav
Krstic-Commander of the Drina Corps-was found guilty of genocide
in the 1995 Srebrenica massacres of as many as 8000 Muslim men and
boys.35 The trial of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic
before the ICTY was plagued by delay and other difficulties before his
death in March 2006 brought the proceedings to an end without a final
verdict. But his indictment for crimes committed in Bosnia, Croatia,
and Kosovo-the first indictment ever to be brought against a sitting
head of state-sent a clear message that nobody is above the law and
contributed to his ultimate fall from power.36 Both tribunals have also
set some groundbreaking legal precedents contributing to the development of international criminal law, and they have played an educational role in focusing world attention on fundamental rules of international law. In bringing major perpetrators to justice, both tribunals
established an official record of the horrendous crimes committed and
the criminal responsibilities of those involved.
Yet, despite these significant steps, both international tribunals may
be remembered in the end as much for their shortcomings as their
accomplishments. For one, they are geographically and psychologically
distant from those most affected by the atrocities they are investigating
and prosecuting. This distance, coupled with only belated and limited
attempts at outreach, has undercut their legitimacy in the eyes of
critical domestic audiences. Limited accurate information about the
tribunals' proceedings, at least at first, undermined the tribunals'
potential impact among local populations. For example, despite work-

34. He was also convicted of conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to
commit genocide, complicity in genocide, and crimes against humanity. Prosecutor v. Kambanda,
Case No. ICTR 97-23-S,Judgment and Sentence, 40 (Sept. 4, 1998). The ICTR also has brought a
number of other high-level perpetrators to justice, including cabinet members and mayors. See,
e.g., Prosecutor v. Gacumbtsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-T (June 17, 2004), available at http://
69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Gachumbitsi/index.htm; Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No.
ICTR 2001-71-4 (July 15, 2004), available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Ndindabahizi/

judgement/150704judgment.pdf.
35. For information on the Krstic case, see Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A,
Judgment in the Appeals Chamber (Apr. 19, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/
Supplement/supp49-e/krstic.htm.
36. See Case Information Sheet: Milosevic (IT-02-54), available at http://www.un.org/icty/

cases-e/index-e.htm. For a discussion of the indictment's impact, see BuRKE-WHITE, supranote 23,
ch. IV. As of January 2007, important ICTY indictees--such as Ratko Mladic and Radovan
Karadzic-still remained at large.
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ing hard to provide an impartial forum, the ICTY has suffered from a
crisis of legitimacy, especially among Serbs, many of whom do not
regard the tribunal as an embodiment of neutral justice.3 7 These
various factors have limited the ability of the international tribunals to
demonstrate fair justice and accountability for atrocities in a way that
resonates with the people most directly affected.
The ICTY and the ICTR also have contributed very little to building
domestic judicial capacity in the Balkans and Rwanda, respectively.
Although this was never their main purpose or preoccupation, both
tribunals could have done much more to assist domestic capacitybuilding. The ICTY and ICTR are in a position to try only a limited
number of high-level cases, so domestic legal systems have a critical role
to play if significant accountability for atrocities is to be realized. But
neither tribunal, until they began focusing systematically on their
completion strategies (for wrapping up their own trials and investigations), had done very much to help strengthen the ability of local
courts to deal with the substantial number of potential suspects remaining to be tried. More has been done since 2003, when the Security
Council called for greater international assistance to improve the
domestic capacity in relevant states and encouraged the ICTY and
ICTR "to develop and improve" their outreach programs.3 8
A.

The ICTY's Impact on Domestic Rule of Law: Kosovo and Bosnia

The ICTY's limited impact on domestic capacity-building is especially unfortunate in light of the more than a billion dollars spent on
the tribunal. 39 Despite the start of an outreach program in 1999 and
other periodic contacts between ICTY personnel and legal communities in the region, systematic and sustained efforts to share the tribu-

37. See Jelena Pejic, The Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Shaky Start, 25

FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 3 n.6 (2001). Others, including a group of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat
judges and prosecutors, have also expressed skepticism regarding the neutrality of the ICTY. See
The Human Rights Ctr., Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, et al., Report, Justice, Accountability and Social
Reconstruction: An Interview Study of BosnianJudges and Prosecutors,18 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 102, 104
(2000) [hereinafterJustice, Accountability, and Social Reconstruction].

38. S.C. Res. 1503,

1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (August 28, 2003). For a discussion of ICTR

outreach, see Victor Peskin, Courting Rwanda: The Promises and Pitfalls of the ICTR's Outreach

Program,3J. INT'L CRIM.JUS. 950, 957 (2005). For examples of ICTY outreach, see the Calendar of
Events, http://www.un.org/icty/bhs/outreach/events.htm (detailing ICTY outreach activities
from 1999 through 2004) [hereinafter ICTY Calendar of Events].

39. Total expenditures through 2005 equaled slightly more than $1 billion. See ICTY at a
Glance, supra note 32. An additional $276.5 million has been authorized for 2006 and 2007. Id.
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nal's technical expertise with justice systems in the region were not
pursued, illustrating a general lack of priority placed on such efforts.4"
As David Tolbert, former senior legal adviser at the ICTY and later
deputy prosecutor, put it: "principally due to a failure in design and, to
a lesser extent, in implementation, the tribunal's long-term impact
on
41
the systems ofjustice in the area of conflict has been minimal."
Take the situation in Kosovo, for instance. The ICTY has devoted
enormous energy and resources to investigating war crimes committed
in Kosovo in 1998-1999, but so far the ICTY and the UN Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK) have not developed formal arrangements for sharing
information or enhancing cooperation.4 2 And although ICTY staff
have shared their expertise with Kosovo jurists in periodic outreach
activities, the ICTY failed to develop systematic, formalized plans to
help enhance the capacity of local institutions to try such complex
cases. 43 Because of the substantial funds invested in the Tribunal's
work, its "lack of impact on at least preparing and buttressing the local
courts" to conduct war crimes prosecutions is "troubling,"44 leaving
more recent efforts associated with ICTY's completion strategy with
considerable ground to cover.
The ICTY has played a somewhat greater role in Bosnia. To provide
some ICTY oversight of domestic prosecutions, Rules of the Road were
agreed on in 1996 between the ICTY and Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia,
respectively. Under this arrangement, ICTY prosecutors review domestic warrants and indictments to ensure their fairness.4 5 On this basis,

40. David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen
Successes andForeseeableShortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. WoRLD AFF. 7, 13-15 (2002).
41. Id. at 8.
42. Legislation evidently is being developed. Press Release, United Nations Mission in
Kosovo, Legislation on Cooperation with ICTY Can Only Be Promulgated by UNMIK, UNMIK/PR/
1123 (Feb. 20, 2004).
43. The outreach program in Kosovo has included ad hoc seminars and information sessions
during which specialists from The Hague share their expertise with Kosovanjurists. See Int'l Crisis
Group, Findingthe Balance: The Scales ofJustice in Kosovo 23, Balkans Report No. 134, Sept. 12, 2002;
ICTY Calendar of Events, supra note 38.
44. Tolbert, supra note 40, at 12. Tolbert argues that with modest resources, the ICTY could
have helped build domestic capacity by training local prosecutors, monitoring court proceedings
in war crimes cases, training judges, and providing advice on victims' issues. Id, at 16. Instead,
despite all the money spent on the ICTY, "there is virtually no effective enforcement of these
important laws in the courts that ultimately matter the most, i.e., the region's domestic courts." Id.
at 8.
45. Paragraph 5 of the Rome Agreement of February 18, 1996, provides that "Persons, other
than those already indicted by the International Tribunal, may be arrested and detained for
serious violations of international humanitarian law only pursuant to a previously issued order,
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trials of lesser war crimes suspects have been taking place in the two
entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 46 The number of cases handled domestically is expected to increase sharply as the ICTY progresses with its
completion strategy, putting an already weak domestic justice system
under serious strain.
Yet concerns about fairness and about impunity have been endemic
in Bosnia from the start. Bosnian cantonal or entity courts have
dispensed justice that has proven highly inadequate, triggering frequent allegations that trials have been tainted by "ethnic justice" and
are being used to exact revenge.4 7 All too often, instead of promoting
justice, war crimes prosecutions in Bosnian courts have been yet
another means of continuing ethnic conflict, undermining the goals of
justice both for victims and for the accused.4 8 With a few notable
exceptions, a disturbing pattern emerged with members of each of the
three ethnic groups engaged in attempts to arrest, prosecute, and
punish for war crimes members of their rival ethnic groups, who often

warrant, or indictment that has been reviewed and deemed consistent with international legal
standards by the International Tribunal." Rome Agreement, Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., 5, Feb.
18, 1996, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/hr-rol/thedept/war-crime-tr/default.asp?contentid=6093.
46. As of November 2003, thirteen war crimes trials were taking place before entity courts.
Amnesty Int'l, Bosnia-Herzegovina:Shelving Justice 6, Al Index EUR 63/018/2003, Nov. 12, 2003
[hereinafter Shelving Justice], available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/EUR630182003
ENGLISH/$File/EUR6301803.pdf. See also Int'l Crisis Group, CourtingDisaster:The Misrule ofLaw
in Bosnia and Herzegovina 31, Balkans Report No. 127, Mar. 25, 2002 [hereinafter CourtingDisaster],
available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/reportarchive/A400592_
25032002.pdf (reporting that, as of March 2002, approximately thirty-five verdicts had been
entered against accused in courts of the Federation). As of May 2002, an estimated 3000 people in
the Republika Srpska and 6000 in the Federation were suspected of war crimes. Shelving Justice,
supra,at 1 D.1. By February 2006, the cantonal prosecutor for Sarajevo and the surrounding area
reported about 2100 war crimes suspects in the region and about 1600 individuals were the subject
of requests for investigation by local authorities. Bosnian TVReports ProsecutorOutlines Progress in
War CrimesProcessing,BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING,Feb. 3,2006, http://listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu/
cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind06O2&L=justwatch-l&D= &O =A&P=9979.
47. See Michael Bohlander, Last Exit Bosnia: Transferring War Crimes Prosecutionfrom the
InternationalTribunalto Domestic Courts, 14 CRIM. L.F. 59, 67 (2003). According to the International
Crisis Group, "[p]ublic debates and mutual accusations of pursuing 'ethnicjustice' with the aim of
eliminating political competitors or protecting one's brethren continue[s], involvinga wide range
of politicians, judges and human rights' activists," and "[a] leitmotif of the controversy [is] a
widely shared recognition that the local judiciary [is] incapable of handling war crimes cases
either competently or fairly." CourtingDisaster,supranote 46, at 33.
48. Aram A. Schvey, Strivingfor Accountability in the Former Yugoslavia, in AccoUNTABILITY FOR
ATRocrrIEs, supranote 13, at 39, 67-68.
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are still viewed as heroes by their respective communities. 49 Thus far,
the majority of war crimes trials have taken place in the Federation,
with Muslim areas targeting almost exclusively Bosnian Serbs and
Croats, and Croatian areas targeting primarily Serbs and Muslims. 50
Rather than promoting healing and confidence-building among the
parties, trials often end up exacerbating divisions and mutual suspicion. 51 The record thus far has been discouraging but some improvements have occurred.5 2 For example, the creation of a special hybrid
War Crimes Chamber within the national State Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina holds real promise.
This special War Crimes Chamber is now composed of national and
international judges, prosecutors, and other staff, but the international
participation will gradually phase out over a period of years.53 This
arrangement is designed to build local capacity to conduct fair trials in
accordance with international standards, and ICTY staff have provided
briefings and materials to judges and lawyers. The tribunal's location in
Sarajevo means that its proceedings are more accessible to the local
population and the prospects for direct outreach are greater. Compared to the problems that have plagued local trials, the special War
Crimes Chamber has a greater capacity to render, and to be seen as
rendering, impartial justice. The court began its first trial in September
2005 and received its first transfer of an indictee from the ICTY two
weeks later.54 The ICTY prosecutor's office has sought the transfer of
an additional twelve defendants, and the local courts continue to send
sensitive war crimes prosecutions to the special chamber. 55 Hybrid

panels within the State Court also address difficult cases involving

49. Id. at 48-49.

50. Id. The first war crimes trial in the Republika Srpska started only in September 2003. See
Human Rights Watch, Bosnia: Massacre Trial Highlights Obstacles to Justice in the Balkans,Jan. 16,
2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/15/bosher6939.htm.
51. See Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities, supranote 13, at 136-37.
52. See OSCE, WAR CRIMES TRIALs BEFORE THE DOMESTIC COURTS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:
PROGRESS AND OBSTACLES 51 (2005); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A CHANCE FOR JUSTICE?: WAR
CRIMES PROSECUTIONS IN BOSNIA'S SERB REPUBIUC 20-21 (2006), availableat http://hrw.org/reports/
2006/bosniaO3O6/bosnia3O6webwcover.pdf.
53. For a description of the special War Crimes Chamber, see Report to the Secretary-Generalof
the Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste
(then East Timor) in 1999, 109-10, 112-13, Annex II, U.N. Doc. S/2005/458 (July 15, 2005)
[hereinafter Commission of Experts Report).
54. Council of Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Compliance With Obligations and Commitments
and Implementation of the Post-Accession Co-OperationProgram, 54, SG/Inf(2005)21 (Nov. 3, 2005).
55. Id.
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organized crime, economic crime, and corruption, with international
participation and assistance that will gradually be phased out leaving
purely domestic actors in place.
Compared to the distant ICTY and the often problematic local trials,
the trials before the State Court's special chamber may be able to
demonstrate impartial justice more directly and effectively to domestic
audiences. The capacity-building effects of this arrangement are also
substantial and vitally important. Even so, several concerns remain. For
one, the schedule for the phase-out of international participation,
driven substantially by funding realities, may be more rapid than is
ideal for effective capacity-building. Furthermore, the entity-level Bosnian courts, rather than the State Court's special chamber, will continue
to handle the bulk of war crimes cases, and if they do not receive
greater assistance, there is a risk that some of the same problems that
have confronted the ICTY may be "replicated at the national level." 5 6
Finally, although trials before the State Court's special chamber can
help provide a model of fair and effective justice at the national level,
systematic outreach and dialogue will still be needed as different
segments of Bosnian society react to the prosecutions, particularly to
those of figures who retain substantial loyalty and support within their
respective communities.
B.

The ICTY and Serbia

The ICTY's contribution to improving the domestic justice system
and building the rule of law has been even more complicated in the
case of Serbia. For many Serbs, the international prosecution of
Milosevic robbed Serbia of the opportunity to hold him accountable in
domestic courts. Milosevic's decision to defend himself and to challenge the very terms of reference of the international tribunal resonated in many quarters within Serbia, and a substantial segment of the
public questioned whether he was getting a fair trial. 57

56. ShelvingJustice,supra note 46, at 8.
57. According to opinion polls, less than one-fourth of Serbs believed Milosevic was getting a
fair trial, and his approval rating doubled at the outset of his trial; he went from being a reviled
individual to the fourth most admired Serb. Michael P. Scharf, The ICTY at Ten: A Critical
Assessment of the MajorRulings of the InternationalCriminalTribunalOver the PastDecade, 37 NEw ENG.
L. RaV. 915, 930-31 (2003). Public opinion within Serbia has varied over the years, and there is
some indication that public opposition to the ICTY diminished after release of the Scorpions
video showing members of a Serbian police unit executing Bosnian Muslims in cold blood. See,
e.g., Nicholas Wood, Videotape of Serbian Police Killing 6 Muslims From Srebrenica Grips Balkans, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 12, 2005, at Al2.
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Several factors have undercut the ICTY's ability to demonstrate to
the Serbian population that the tribunal has been fair and impartial in
its pursuit of accountability for atrocities. For one, many Serbs take a
different view of the history of the breakup of the former Yugoslavia,
rejecting the view of predominant Serb responsibility taken by NATO
states supporting the ICTY. The tribunal's failure to indict leaders such
as Croatian President Tudjman, who is now dead, has left the ICTY
open to perceptions within Serbia of an anti-Serb bias. For many Serbs,
this perception was reinforced by the tribunal's decision not to investigate NATO's actions during the Kosovo war. The circumstances surrounding the domestic handover of Milosevic to the ICTY also remain
controversial, and many Serbs view the government's cooperation with
the tribunal as strictly a function of monetary pressures rather than of
justice. Finally, Milosevic sought to use his trial as a platform to
influence public opinion in Serbia and was surprisingly effective at
representing himself in court and portraying himself as an underdog.
All of these perceptions have been compounded by the ICTY's lack
of effective outreach within Serbia. If the ICTY had provided Serbs with
a clearer idea of its operations and purpose, early on, they might have
been less prone to view the tribunal so skeptically. The ICTY did
establish an outreach office in 1999 to inform people of the region
about its work, but in crucial earlier phases the ICTY's work was subject
to "gross distortions and disinformation" in many parts of the former
Yugoslavia. 58 As ICTY official David Tolbert noted, "the tribunal be-

came a political football for certain unscrupulous politicians in the
region who cynically manipulated ...misunderstandings., 59 The ICTY
should have anticipated this potential opposition and taken steps to
ensure that the Serbian population would hear the truth about its
operations from the very start.
The ICTY's contribution to capacity-building within Serbia has also
been sorely lacking. Although more than a billion dollars has supported the ICTY since its inception, 60 relatively little has been done to
share the tribunal's technical expertise or to assist local courts, even
though they are expected to bring to justice many perpetrators not
tried in The Hague. Even though sharing its expertise and assisting
local courts is not formally part of ICTY's mandate, more efforts to do
this could have earned the ICTY considerable goodwill in Serbia and

58. Tolbert, supra note 40, at 13.
59. Id.
60. See ICTY at a Glance, supranote 32.
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helped to better prepare local courts to continue prosecutions after the
ICTY concludes its operations.
Yet, despite these problems, attitudes in Serbia-at least among
some groups-may gradually be changing, and the ICTY may yet have a
positive impact over the longer term. Although Serbia had completed
only four domestic war crimes trials by January 2003, despite a large
number of suspected war criminals within its borders, Serbia created a
new Special Court for Organized Crimes and War Crimes later that
year.6" An exclusively domestic court, Serbia's Special Court receives
international support, and the law establishing the Court provides for
cooperation with the ICTY. In the Special Court's first case, the "Ovcara
trial," in which a number of Serbs were accused of executing 192
Croatian prisoners of war at the Ovcara pig farm in the Croatian city of
Vukovar in 1991, ICTY prosecutor Carla del Ponte provided at least
eight boxes of evidence to the Court, and Croatia provided exhumation records.62 The ICTY's support to the Special Court in this case and
in other potential cases is an important development as the ICTY
begins to bring its own work to a close over the next few years. In
December 2005, the Special Court completed the Ovcara trial, handing
down lengthy prison sentences for fourteen of the sixteen defendants.

63

Also in 2005, the emergence of a videotape showing members of the
Serbian police unit known as the Scorpions callously executing Muslims at Srebrenica was aired extensively in Serbia and internationally
after first being played at the Milosevic trial on June 1, 2005.64 As of late
2006, one member of the unit depicted on the tape had been convicted
in Croatia, and five others were on trial in Serbia.6 5
Serbia's Special Court has only recently begun its work and its
long-term impact within Serbia remains to be seen. The Ovcara trial, at

61. For the text of the law, which passed in July, 2003, see http://www.osce.org/documents/
fry/2003/07/446_en.pdf.
62. Milanka Saponja Hadzic, Serbian Judiciary Facing Key Test, INST. FOR WAR AND PEACE

Mar. 15,2004, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=tri&s=f&o= 166164&apcstate=henitri2004;
Press Release, Humanitarian Law Ctr., "Ovcara" Case: A Trial Is Professional but the Indictment Is
Amiss (Apr. 6, 2005), available at http://www.hlc.org.yu/english/War_CrimesTrialsBefore_
NationalCourts/index.php?file= 1135.html.
REPORTING,

63. Serbian CourtJails 14 Over 1991 "Execution"of Prisoners in Croatia, BBC NEWSFLE, Dec. 12,

2005.
64. Wood, supra note 57.
65. SerbJailedoverSrebrenicaVideo, BBC NEws, Dec. 29,2005, availableathttp://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/europe/4567704.stm; "Scorpions" Case Nears End, B92, Dec. 17, 2006, http://www.b92.net/

eng/news/society-article.phpyyy=2006&mm= 12&dd= 17&navcategory= I 13&navid=38678.
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least initially, received considerable domestic attention, and it may
have helped to encourage greater public dialogue and awareness
regarding war crimes, at least to some extent. The release and repeated
broadcast in Serbia of the Scorpions video has added to that public
discussion. Domestic debates over the ICTY still remain highly chargedand prone to opportunistic manipulation by political factions-but the
ICTY's legal support to domestic prosecutions like the Ovcara case may
help, over time, to demonstrate accountability and build domestic
capacity in a manner more widely viewed as credible within Serbia.
C.

The ICTt- An Ambivalent Domestic Impact

The ICT'R's impact within Rwanda has likewise been mixed. The
tribunal's relationship with the Rwandan government was uneasy from
the start. After seeking international assistance in bringing perpetrators of Rwanda's devastating genocide to justice, Rwanda was the only
state on the UN Security Council to vote against establishing the ICTR
Rwanda's objections-which still fester-included the failure to locate
the tribunal within Rwanda, the lack of a provision for capital punishment, and the limits on the time frame of the court's jurisdiction.6 6
Significant management problems early on at the ICTR, coupled with
the over one billion dollars spent on the ICTR while Rwanda's domestic system struggles to try thousands of suspects, have also been a source
of resentment and tension. The limited number of individuals that the
ICTR is able to try, the slow pace of proceedings at the tribunal, and the
limited role for, and attention to, needs of victims have all been
criticisms raised by Rwandan political leaders.67
In the face of these criticisms, the ICTR has had a difficult time establishing
broad credibility among the Rwandan public. "Constantly exposed to such
bitter criticism highlighting the imperfections of the Tribunal, many
Rwandans tend to hold an overwhelmingly negative opinion of international justice," notes Aloys Habimana. 68 For many Rwandans, moreover,
the individuals who directly committed atrocities in front of their own eyes
matter as much as the more distant architects of the genocide.
The ICTR should have done more from the start to explain its
purpose and its proceedings broadly within Rwanda and to address

66. Aloys Habimana, JudicialResponses to Mass Violence: Is the InternationalCriminalTribunalfor
Rwanda Making a Difference Towards Reconciliationin Rwanda?, in INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIALS:
MAKING A DIFEREN CE? 83, 84--85

(Steven R. Ratner &James L. Bischoff eds., 2003).

67. Id. at 85.
68. ld. at 86.
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concerns raised by citizens. Instead, the tribunal's outreach has been
belated and its physical presence within Rwanda has been limited.6 9
Created in 1994, with its first trials commencing in 1997, the ICTR
established an outreach project only in 1998 and an Information
Center in Rwanda in 2000.70 The ICTR's own web site has improved,
and several web sites managed by international NGOs publish good
information and analysis on the ICTR, but very few Rwandans have
internet access, so this information is largely available only to foreigners. 71 Radio Rwanda reports from the tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania,
and a number of organizations, including the European Commission
and some NGOs, support outreach efforts that include distributing
documents and showing documentary films about the ICTR in the
Rwandan countryside. 72 In August 2006, staff from the ICTR's Information Center in Kigali held a full-day workshop in Nyagatare town
"aimed at sensitizing the people in the area" about the ICTR's proceedings and the progress of the genocide trials-an initiative that will
continue in other provinces. 73 Morever, the ICTR's outreach department has stepped up its efforts in 2006 and 2007 to hold discussions in

69. All of the courtrooms for the ICTR are in Arusha, Tanzania, and the ICTR's main formal
presence in Rwanda is with the Office of the Prosecutor (formerly Carla del Ponte, now Hassan
Jallow from the Gambia). The ICTR opened its Information Center in Kigali in 2000, three years
after its first trials commenced. In 2007, the ICTR expects to open additional information centers
throughout Rwanda. See Tim Gallimore, The ICTR Outreach Program: Integrating Justice and
Reconciliation (Nov. 7-8, 2006) (conference paper), available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/
challenging__impunity/gallimore.pdf, for a discussion of a wide range of recent ICTR outreach
initiatives.
70. Peter Uvin & Charles Mironko, Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwanda, 9 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 219, 221 (2003). The Information Center, Umusanzu mu Bwiyunge ("Contribution to

reconciliation"), in Rwanda's capital, Kigali, is open to "students,journalists, civil servants,judges
and lawyers, as well as ordinary citizens." ICTR, Report of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the
Prosecutionof PersonsResponsiblefor Genocide and Other Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsiblefor Genocide and Other Such
Violations Committed in the Territory of NeighbouringStates between 1 Januaryand 31 December 1994, U.N.

Doc. S/2003/707, A/58/140 (July 11, 2003) [hereinafter ICTR Report], available at http://
65.18.216.88/ENGLISH/annualreports/a58/140e.pdf.
71. Uvin & Mironko, supranote 70, at 219.
72. Id. The U.S.-based Internews media organization, for example, has produced documentary films about ICTR and domestic war crimes trials, which are then shown in rural communities,
sometimes accompanied by Rwandan ICTR outreach officers. See Peskin, supra note 38, at 960
(urging the ICTR to establish partnerships with Rwandan civil society leaders and academics,
some of whom have tried to secure ICTR's commitment, thus far unsuccessfully, "to hold post-trial
seminars in Rwanda with ICTR officials to discuss the significance of recent trials," which could be
a foundation for further Rwandan-initiated outreach).
73. Rwanda: ICTR Sensitizes Residents on Proceedings,AFR. NEws, Aug. 25, 2006.
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schools throughout Rwanda, town hall meetings, and training sessions
and seminars for Rwandan legal personnel and forjournalists covering
the court, and it expects to open new information and documentation
centers throughout Rwanda in 2007. TM This is an important beginning,
but much more needs to be done if the ICTR expects to have a
longer-term impact within Rwanda.
Still, despite a slow start, the ICTR has the potential to demonstrate
the importance of accountability and fair justice to audiences within
Rwanda in a number of ways. First, the tribunal has brought high-level
perpetrators of genocide to justice. This sends "a clear message to
victims, victimizers, and bystanders that leaders who commit gross
violations of human rights are not always invincible," which is a message
that "is fundamental for ensuring the rule of law in a post-conflict
society like that of Rwanda," as Aloys Habimana argues. 75 Second, these
trials reveal how self-interested leaders exploited ethnic differences for
their own purposes-which may contribute to a greater domestic
understanding of the causes of the genocide and possibly lay some
foundation for reconciliation over time. 76 Finally, through fair trials
that follow fundamental principles of due process, the tribunal can
77
help demonstrate to Rwandans "what 'fair justice' should look like,"
potentially providing a point of reference for future domestic reforms.
But to have any sustainable long-term impacts along these lines will
require more extensive and effective outreach within Rwanda than has
occurred thus far. This is an uphill battle given the skepticism about the
tribunal among many audiences in Rwanda. The tribunal, in short,
faces a major challenge "not only to render justice, but also to make
sure that Rwandans, in all their complex categories, see that justice is
being done. 78 Yet, so far, the ICTR has been reluctant to partner with
independent civil society organizations to engage in sustained outreach, thereby missing opportunities for empowering ripple effects;
instead, the ICTR has preferred to interact with the Rwandan government and "government-backed survivor groups," whose cooperation
79
the tribunal needs.

74. Gallimore, supranote 69, at 2-4.
75. Habimana, supranote 66, at 88.
76. Id. at 89.
77. Id.

78. Id. at 90.
79. See Peskin, supra note 38, at 961. Peskin notes that despite overtures from leading
academics and human rights activists, including Aloys Habimana, the ICTR had not embarked on
cooperative partnerships with them to engage in more extensive outreach. Id. at 960-61.
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The ICTR also needs to do more, before its work comes to an end, to
contribute to capacity-building within Rwanda's domestic justice system. But, until relatively recently, the ICTR had done almost nothing to
contribute to the capacity of the Rwandan judiciary. 80 One of the few
earlier activities led by the ICTR involving the Rwandan judiciary was a
September 2003 visit by twenty senior Rwandanjudicial officials (judges,
prosecutors, and senior officials) to the tribunal in Arusha. 8 ' The focus
was primarily on issues related to the pursuit of justice at the ICTR
(e.g., witness protection, pace of proceedings, and completion strategy) rather than on capacity-building for the Rwandan justice system
itself.82 More recently, particularly since 2006, the ICTR has expanded
its capacity-building efforts in Rwanda to include more training sessions for Rwandan legal personnel, including training in on-line legal
research, evidence and case management, and other matters. 83 Still,

one is left wondering whether some of the millions of dollars spent
annually on the ICTR could have been better spent on direct domestic
capacity-building, particularly given Rwanda's desire to undertake domestic criminal prosecutions and community-based accountability proceedings.
In short, both the ICTR and the ICTY have faced obstacles in leaving
a positive, long-term legacy in the countries most affected by the
atrocities they are prosecuting. In future international prosecutions,
some of these difficulties could be addressed by earlier, more effective
outreach to domestic audiences, and by more systematic efforts to
design focused, well-conceived domestic capacity-building programs.
International tribunals located far from the affected country with little
or no involvement by national judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel are inherently limited in the direct impact they are likely to have

80. Id. at 957-58. ICTR-led training sessions for Rwandanjustice system personnel and other
capacity-building activities have increased in 2006 and 2007. Gallimore, supra note 69, at 4-6.
81. The ICTR Registrar extended the invitation, and two groups of ten officials spent one
week each at the tribunal. The purpose was "to strengthen the co-operation between the Rwandan
judicial system and the Tribunal in what is called appuijudiciaireto the national Rwandese judicial
bodies." Press Release, ICTR, Rwandan Judicial Officials Visit the ICTR, ICTR/INFO-9-2-360.EN
(Sept. 26,2003), availableat http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2003/360.htm. The ICTR

has also organized visits to the tribunal by Rwandan law students, as well as some internships.
Peskin, supra note 38, at 950, 955-56.
82. Int'l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 81.
83. Gallimore, supra note 69, at 4-6. In addition, most of the new information centers that the
ICTR expects to open throughout Rwanda in 2007 "will be housed in justice complexes to
facilitate access for Rwandan judicial and legal staff to the jurisprudence of the ICTR and to
technology which will enable them to perform legal research on-line." Id. at 3.
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domestically in post-conflict societies. But purely domestic proceedings
may not be the answer either-at least in cases where national justice
systems are devastated by conflict or unlikely to deliver fair or impartial
justice. Hybrid, or mixed, tribunals with both national and international participation may, in some instances, hold more promise.

IV.

HYBRID TRIBUNALS AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOMESTIC RULE OF LAW

Hybrid tribunals first emerged toward the end of the 1990s as an
alternative to purely international or purely domestic courts. In a
number of countries-Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Bosniahybrid arrangements have been established to try individuals for violations of international and sometimes also domestic law. In addition to
combining national and international staff-judges and prosecutors,
among others-these hybrids are located directly in the country that
experienced the atrocities.
Hybrids, in many ways, are like a piece of clay that can be molded to
fit the challenges and circumstances at hand. But they have been
shaped by political necessity and compromise as much as by any grand
theory. In the case of Kosovo, for instance, biased domestic trials
provoked outcries from Kosovo's Serbian population; this led the
United Nations to design a hybrid system in which panels comprised of
a majority of international judges would address war crimes and other
sensitive cases and international prosecutors could revive cases dismissed by domestic prosecutors."4 In other situations-East Timor and
Cambodia-hybrids were negotiated because critical states simply did
not want to create new international tribunals even in the face of major
atrocities. 85

84. MICHAEL E. HARTMANN, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN
Kosovo 112 (2003), availableat http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr112.html. Hartmann
was the first international prosecutor to serve under this arrangement.
85. The Cambodian government together with China, for instance, rejected calls by a group
of experts for an international tribunal to try former Khmer Rouge leaders. See Rachel S. Taylor,
BetterLate Than Never: Cambodia'sJoint Tribunal, inAcCOuNTABILrrYFORATROCITIES, supra note 13, at
256; China Officially Rejects InternationalCourtfor Cambodia,AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 19, 1999.
Yet Cambodia domestic courts were in no position to provide impartial justice in such cases. See
Taylor, supra, at 254. So the United Nations and Cambodia-with U.S. involvement along the
way-negotiated a compromise hybrid tribunal with a majority of Cambodian judges, although
this agreement is only now slowly being implemented. See id. at 258-61. In East Timor, the United
Nations together with key states opted for a hybrid arrangement-joint national/international
judicial panels within East Timor and domestic prosecutions in Indonesia-even though there
were good reasons to doubt whether high-level Indonesian military officials would ultimately face
justice under such an arrangement, at least absent sustained international pressure.
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Though they differ in form and origins, hybrids have at least the
potential to overcome some of the limitations of purely international
or purely domestic proceedings. s6 They may, for instance, enjoy greater
legitimacy among affected local populations than either international
prosecutions far away or domestic prosecutions before ajustice system
of limited means or credibility. International participation and resources can help ensure that the proceedings satisfy international
standards of due process, while domestic participation can give citizens
of the country most affected a greater stake and sense of ownership.
Thus, hybrids may demonstrate accountability in a way that resonates
more effectively with local populations.
Second, hybrids may have advantages in contributing to domestic
capacity-building and institutionalization of accountability norms. Locating tribunals directly in countries that endured atrocities-and
including national participation in their work at all levels-provides an
opportunity to build capacity and leave behind a tangible contribution
to the national justice system, including resources, facilities, and training. Finally, by providing for direct interaction between national and
international jurists and by enhancing opportunities for outreach to
the local population, hybrids may be more effective than either international or national processes alone in fostering awareness of, and
encouraging respect for, fundamental principles of international law
and human rights at the domestic level among citizens and officials of
the country involved. They may, to borrow from
political science
87
terminology, be more effective at "norm diffusion."
But whether recent hybrids are actually achieving these results is a
much more complicated question. The demonstration effects and
capacity-building impact of these diverse hybrids, in fact, have varied
widely. The following sections review the results of hybrid systems in
Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone in detail.
A.

Kosovo's HybridArrangenwt: Mixed Results

In Kosovo, UNMIK established a hybrid judicial arrangement in 2000
to prosecute and try war crimes cases. The ICTY has primacy over such
cases arising in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, but it cannot try
them all, so domestic courts also have a critical role to play in achieving

86. For a thoughtful analysis, see Dickinson, supranote 19.
87. See generally Finnemore & Sikkink, InternationalNorm Dynamics and PoliticalChange, supra
note 27 (discussing norm diffusion).
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accountability. 8 In Kosovo, however, the local judicial system was
seriously incapacitated. Most of the local judges and lawyers-of predominantly Serb ethnicity-fled the province or refused to serve in the
UN-established judicial system, and newly appointed Kosovar Albanian
judges lacked professional experience because of their decade-long
exclusion as a result of officially sanctioned discrimination. But in
ethnically divided Kosovo, the virtually monoethnic, UN-appointed
judiciary was not perceived as providing-nor could it deliverimpartial justice. Only after mounting pressure from ethnic Serbs in
what was increasingly viewed as a biased justice system did UNMIK
introduce international judges and prosecutors to serve in Kosovo's
judicial system.
The initial deployment of these international jurists in 2000 was
"crisis driven" and improvised, rather than the result of a carefully
designed and implemented strategy.89 Appointed to most, but not all,
war crimes and other sensitive cases, including ethnic crimes and
high-level organized crime, the international jurists initially had little
impact: they were in the minority onjudicial panels and were invariably
outvoted by Kosovar Albanian judges. This only reinforced perceptions
of "victor's justice" among Kosovo's Serbian population-now with the
involvement of the international community-which reinforced resentments and ethnic tensions rather than helping to defuse them. In the
face of these clear shortcomings, UNMIK issued regulations in December 2000 providing for the introduction of majority international
judicial panels and empowering international prosecutors to reactivate
cases abandoned by their Kosovar counterparts.
These "64 panels," named after UNMIK's Regulation 2000/64 establishing them, have helped to reduce perceptions of bias in the justice
system and have redressed some earlier miscarriages of justice. Nevertheless, shortcomings in implementation and some subjective aspects
of this arrangement have undermined their potential impact. Introduced by UNMIK without consulting and involving local jurists, the

88. The ICTY has jurisdiction over serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the former Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991, including war crimes, genocide, and
crimes against humanity. The ICTYs jurisdiction is concurrent with national courts, but it enjoys
primacy and can request a national court to defer to it. Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 9, annexed to The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary
GeneralPursuantto Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808, 36, 39 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704
(1993) [hereinafter ICTYStatute]; IGTYR. P. &EVID. 9-11 (2005), availableathttp://www.un.org/
icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm.
89. HARTMANN, supra note 84, at 13.
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arrangement faced resistance by local judges, and some have refused to
participate in majority international panels.90 Moreover, the grounds
for participation of international judges and prosecutors have been
criticized as overly vague and subjective, contributing to a perception,
especially among Albanians, that the system is a "parallel justice system"
vulnerable to political influence and maneuvering. Also, because the
regulation does not guarantee prosecution by an international prosecutor before a majority international panel, Kosovo Serb defendants also
view the arrangement as vulnerable to double standards and unequal
treatment.9 1 Thus, the "64 panels" have only partially been able to
address public perceptions of bias in ethnically charged Kosovo.
Viewed over the long term, the demonstration effects of the hybrid
panels within Kosovo clearly have been mixed. On the one hand, the
majority international panels' ability to consider particularly delicate
and divisive cases, coupled with the international prosecutors' ability to
revive and pursue cases abandoned by local counterparts, has helped to
address systemic biases and miscarriages ofjustice in the largely monoethnic local justice system. On the other hand, UNMIK's belated, ad
hoc introduction of the "64 panels" was a missed opportunity to
demonstrate a commitment and a capacity for impartial justice from
the start.
As the first international prosecutor in Kosovo, Michael Hartmann,
has observed, international participation in the judiciary would have
been more successful had it been "immediate and bold" rather than
"incremental and crisis driven."9 2 Early prosecutions and trials before
majority international panels could have enhanced the real and perceived impartiality of the judiciary, increasing its legitimacy among the
different sectors of the population. Rather than empowering local
jurists and then belatedly stripping them of their "monopoly" over
sensitive cases, such a policy would have been easier and likely less
contentious to implement. Furthermore, beginning with a more systematic international role in the local judicial system could have had a
broader impact by helping to limit the destructive influence and
entrenchment of criminal power structures and their linkages to
extremist ethnic and nationalist groups. °3
Not surprisingly, the capacity-building results of Kosovo's hybrid

90. David Marshall & Shelley Inglis, The Disempowerment of Human Rights-BasedJustice in the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo, 16 HARv.HUm. RTs.J. 95, 130 (2003).

91. Seeid at 134.
92. HAIR mAsN,supra note 84, at 13.
93. Id.
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panels also have been less than was hoped for. Despite the potential for
mutual learning when international jurists serve besides local judges, a
number of the international judges, especially early on, had little
background or training in international humanitarian law.9 4 This
limited their ability to contribute to local capacity-building in this area.
Language barriers, the intensive workload, and the lack of systematic
mentoring mechanisms all hampered potential capacity-building more
generally. The hybrid arrangement in Kosovo, which places the most
sensitive cases before the "64 panels," also has delayed the day when
Kosovo's local judges have to take full responsibility for adjudicating
such cases. 95
All of this suggests that hybrids are more likely to be effective in
demonstrating accountability and fair justice, and in developing local
capacity, if they are designed in a more strategic way than was the case
with Kosovo's early experiment. It may well be, at least in circumstances
where local legal capacity is absent or devastated, that turning to
international jurists early on-if they possess the necessary legal background and skills-makes sense as an initial response, while local jurists
are trained effectively and expeditiously to join, as soon as possible, in
the task of adjudicating sensitive and difficult war crimes cases. In any
event, creating standing panels with clear jurisdiction-rather than ad
hoc discretionary panels-to address war crimes and other sensitive
cases may be less vulnerable to perceptions of political malleability by
affected populations.9 6
B.

East Timor: "Independenceis a Form ofJustice"

East Timor's hybrid tribunal for serious crimes has faced tough
challenges in pursuing accountability amidst the political complexities
associated with the nation's transition to independence, yielding deeply
ambivalent demonstration effects. During East Timor's historic referendum in 1999, militias operating with the aid and support of the

94. Marshall & Inglis, supra note 90, at 129 ("Of the internationals that were appointed
between 1999 and 2001, few had conducted trials involving serious criminal offenses and none
had any practical experience in, or knowledge of, international humanitarian law.").
95. Indeed, a recent study by the International Center for Transitional Justice argues that,
thus far, the program's "effect has been limited mainly to substituting for, rather than bolstering,
domestic capacity" and that "the continued need for internationals may be undermining
long-term confidence in the domestic legal system." TOM PERRIELLO & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT'L CrR.
FOR TRANSrriONAL JUSTiCE, LESSONS FROM THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND PROSECU-

TORS IN Kosovo

2 (2006)

96. For discussion of Bosnia's hybrid war crimes chamber, see Part IIIA of this Article.
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Indonesian army perpetrated atrocities-murders, rapes, looting and
burning-against pro-independence Timorese. An international commission of inquiry established at the UN Human Rights Commission in
1999 called for an international tribunal to bring those responsible to
justice. But crucial states and UN leaders-involved in delicate negotiations with Indonesia to secure its consent to the deployment of an
international military force, INTERFET, to stabilize East Timor after
the referendum-instead pressed Indonesia to bring those responsible
for the violence to justice domestically. 9 7 In opting not to establish an
international tribunal for this purpose, many no doubt hoped that
persistent international pressure on Indonesia might produce meaningful domestic accountability; but, at the same time, the absence of an
international accountability mechanism with clear enforcement authority undermined the prospects of trying leading Indonesian suspects if
Indonesia itself chose not to do so.
Within East Timor, the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET)
established an innovative hybrid tribunal in June 2000 (in lieu of an
international tribunal per se). The Special Panels for Serious Crimeshybrid judicial panels within the Dili District Court consisting of two
international judges and one Timorese judge-were created to try
cases of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other atrocities. 98
UNTAET also established the Serious Crimes Unit, a UN-funded
prosecutorial and investigatory office for serious crimes, to serve as the
prosecutorial and investigations arm of the hybrid tribunal.9 9 Although

97. In an April 2000 MOU between Indonesia and the UN, Indonesia agreed to share
information and transfer indictees to East Timor. Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Republic of Indonesia and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
Regarding Cooperation in Legal, Judicial and Human Rights Related Matters, Apr. 6, 2000,
available at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Resources/2000/MOU(e).htm. INTERFET, a UNauthorized military force (with Indonesian consent) led by Australia deployed in August 1999 to
restore stability to East Timor, followed by a UN provisional administration-the UN Transitional
Administration in East Timor (or UNTAET) together with a UN peacekeeping force. See S.C. Res.
1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
98. The panels were given jurisdiction over genocide, torture, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes; in addition, they had jurisdiction over murder and sexual offenses committed from
January 1, 1999 through October 25, 1999-the period leading up to and following the
referendum and before the UN became administering authority in East Timor. U.N. Transitional
Administration in East Timor [UNTAET], On the Establishment of Panels with ExclusiveJurisdictin
Over Serious Criminal Offences, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000). Although the
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and the other international crimes was not time limited,
the Serious Crimes Unit focused its prosecutions on the crimes surrounding the 1999 referendum.
99. UNTAET Reg. 2000/16, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/16 (June 6,2000).
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both the Special Panels and Serious Crimes Unit received UN funding,
defense counsel received more limited, ad hoc support-an imbalance
of concern from the start.1 00 In 2002, the successor UN mission
(UNMISET) established a Defense Lawyer's Unit to provide more
resources and expertise to assist in defense of suspects before the
Special Panels.101 Overall, however, neither political support (international or domestic) nor resources for East Timor's hybrid tribunal were
ever as forthcoming as many originally had hoped.
These limitations seriously constrained the tribunal's impact both in
achieving accountability for the atrocities surrounding the referendum
and in capacity-building. The special tribunal faced chronic shortages
of administrative, legal, and linguistic support, particularly at the
beginning. In early trials, for instance, no court reporters or other
means were available to produce records of the proceedings. 10 2 Interpreters frequently were unavailable in some of the four languages
(Portuguese, Bahasa Indonesia, Tetum, and English) in which proceedings were conducted. Resources for defense counsel were particularly
limited, and no defense witnesses were called at all in a number of the
early trials. 10 3 Significant improvements certainly occurred over time,
but a shortage of resources and support personnel continued to
hamper the tribunal, which concluded its last trials in 2005, with
appeals to be completed in 2006.104
Substantively, the hybrid tribunal's impact in terms of demonstrating
accountability and fair justice has been ambiguous, at best. On the one
hand, the tribunal tried a significant number of individuals for crimes
against humanity and other offenses in proceedings that an international commission of experts concluded generally accorded with international standards. 10 5 A total of 87 defendants were tried, with 84

100. See David Cohen, SeekingJusticeon the Cheap: Is the East Timor Tribunal Really a Modelfor the
Future?,61 ASIA PACIFIC ISSUES, Aug. 2002, at4, 5, availableathttp://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/
pdfs/api06L.pdf; Suzanne Katzenstein, Note, Hybrid Tribunals: SearchingforJusticein East Timor, 16
HARv. HUM. RTs.J. 245, 251,262-64 (2003).
101. For analysis of the Defense Lawyer's Unit, see Commission of Experts Report, supranote 53,
at 36-37.
102. Cohen, supra note 100, at 5; Katzenstein, supranote 100, at 260.
103. Cohen, supra note 100, at 5-6; Katzenstein, supranote 100, at 253.
104. The UN Security Council decided to conclude the mandate of the special panels in May
2005 when UNMISET's mandate ended, and it urged that all trials be concluded by then. S.C. Res.
1543, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1543 (May 14, 2004). In fact, some appeals were handled subsequently
and, as of February 2006, two defendants still had appeals pending. SeeJudicial System Monitoring
Programme, http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/ (follow hyperlinks under SPSC Case Information).
105. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 53, 1357, at 86.
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convicted and 3 acquitted.' 0 6 The Serious Crimes Unit also issued
many indictments-a total of 95 against 440 defendants-including
some against high-level Indonesian military officials. 10 7 On the other
hand, the vast majority of the accused (339 individuals) are beyond the
physical jurisdiction of the court (mostly in Indonesia), and they are
unlikely ever to be either extradited to East Timor for trial or credibly
tried in Indonesia absent sustained international pressure on Indonesia, which has not been forthcoming, particularly since 9/11. The net
result is that East Timor's hybrid tribunal tried only mid- and lowerlevel indictees, mostly Timorese ex-militia members involved in the
violence surrounding the referendum, but did not reach the higherlevel suspects in Indonesia. When those at the top never face justice, it
sends a very mixed message about accountability to Timorese citizens.
The situation of Indonesia's General Wiranto illustrates this dilemma. Wiranto, who was defense minister and commander of the
armed forces of Indonesia at the time of the Timorese referendum, is
charged, along with six other high-ranking Indonesian military officers
and the former governor of East Timor, with committing crimes
against humanity-murder, deportation, and persecution-in 1999.108
After many months, the special court issued a warrant for his arrest, but
East Timorese officials refrained from handing the warrant to Interpol
for international action. Key Timorese leaders, including President
Xanana Gusmao, have placed a higher priority on forward-looking
reconciliation and on building a strong relationship with Indonesia

106. SeeJudicial System Monitoring Programme, The SpecialPanelsfor Serious Crimes HearTheir
Final Case,Justice Update, May 12-May 20, Issue 12/2005 [hereinafter JSMPJustice Update], available at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Justice%20update/2005/May%202005/050520_,SMP
JUissuel2(e).pdf. For information on cases, seeJSMPJusticeUpdate,as well as American University,
War Crimes Research Office, SpecialPanelsfor Serious Crimes in East Timor Status Updates, availableat
http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/easttimorstatus.cfm.
107. JSMPJustice Update, supra note 106. Those indicted include General Wiranto (former
Defense Minister and Commander of the Armed Forces of Indonesia), Major General Zacky
Anwar Makarim (Security Task Force Advisor), Major General Adam Damiri (former Chief of the
Regional Military Command), Brigadier General Suhartono Suratman (former Military Commander for East Timor), Colonel Mohmanned Noer Muis (Commander of the Sub-Regional
Command 164), Brigadier General Timbul Silaen (former Chief of Police for East Timor), and
Lieutenant Colonel Yayat Sudrajat (Commander of the Intelligence Task Force of Sub-Regional
Command 164). Amnesty Int'l &Judicial Sys. Monitoring Programme, Justicefor Timor-Leste: The
Way Fonard,§ 3.3, Al Index ASA 21/006/2004, Apr. 1, 2004, availableat http://news.amnesty.org/
library/index/engasa210062004.
108. Wiranto is charged under the principle of command responsibility. Indictment, Deputy
Gen. Prosecutor for Serious Crimes v. Waranto, No. 05/2003 (D. Dili filed Feb. 24, 2003), available
at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Court%20Monitoring/spsccaseinforation2003.htm.
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than on seeking judicial accountability for the 1999 atrocities.1 0 9 Gusmao, in particular, has argued that pressing Indonesia might produce a
military backlash just at a moment when the country was struggling to
solidify its own democratic reforms. 1 0 Indeed, Gusmao met with
Wiranto-then a candidate for president of Indonesia-in 2004, just
before the Indonesian elections, proclaiming that bygones should be
bygones. 1 Although other Timorese officials, such as then Foreign
Minister Jose Ramos-Horta, were critical of this meeting and its timing,1 12 few Timorese leaders are comfortable pressuring their powerful
neighbor to hand over top figures given their strong desire to improve
East Timor's economy, to resolve border issues, and generally to build
cordial relations with Indonesia. Even East Timor's prosecutor-general,
the importance of bringing Wiranto to
who earlier had emphasized
113
justice, later backed off.
Timorese political leaders consistently have emphasized the importance of consolidating East Timor's independence and building a
strong relationship with Indonesia. Ramos-Horta has stressed, moreover, that "independence is a form of justice."'1 4 This is an important
point from someone who, along with Gusmao and many others,
devoted his career to East Timor's long and historic struggle for
independence. Independence for the Timorese people does provide
tangible vindication for their struggle and their suffering. And East
Timor clearly needs to consolidate its long-sought independence and
to build constructive relationships with its neighbors.

109. President Gusmao was elected overwhelmingly as East Timor's first president, and he
has placed a strong emphasis on looking forward. Gusmao has focused on pursuing economic
development and "social justice" in East Timor-and on achieving reconciliation and reintegrating resistance fighters and remaining remnants of opposing militias into Timorese society. See
Rachel S. Taylor, Justice and Reconciliation in East Timor, Interview: East Timorese President Xanana

Gusmao, WORLD PRESS REviEW, Oct. 1, 2002. Gusmao has also sought to establish constructive
relations with Indonesia-East Timor's powerful neighbor and key trading partner. See, e.g.,
Gusmao Hopesfor BetterRelations with Indonesia, ASIAN Poll. NEws, July 8, 2002.
110. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Letter dated 14July 2005from the Secretary-Generaladdressed

to the Presidentof the Security Council,U.N. Doc. S/2005/459 annex 1 (July 15, 2005).
111. East Timor's Foreign Minister Questions Gusmao's Meeting With Wiranto, ASSOCIATED PRESS,

May 30, 2004, http://www.etan.org/et2004/may/22/30etmin.htm.
112. Id.
113. ForwardingWiranto Warrant to Interpol Not in E. Timor Interest: Prosecutor,AGENCE FRANCE

PRESSE, May 25, 2004, available at http://www.etan.org/et2004/may/22/26forwar.htm;

CArnjN

REIGER & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT'L CIR. FOR TRANSmONAL JUSTICE, THE SERIOUS CRIMES PROCESS IN

TIMOR-LESTE: IN RETROSPECT 33 (2006).
114. Interview with Jose Ramos-Horta, Foreign Minister, East Timor, in Dili, East Timor

(Nov. 2003).
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Yet, lack of accountability has been a bitter pill to swallow. As many
human rights advocates, church leaders, and civil society organizations
in East Timor and elsewhere emphasize, the victims and survivors of the
brutal atrocities in 1999-and during the much longer quarter century
of Indonesian occupation-deserve to know the truth about who was
responsible and see those who bear the greatest responsibility held
accountable in some way. East Timor's Commission for Reception,
Truth and Reconciliation has argued that "the crimes committed in
1999 were far outweighed by those committed during the previous
twenty-four years of occupation and cannot be properly understood 1or
15
addressed without acknowledging the truth of the long conflict."
The Commission also urges that the mandate of the Special Panels and
Serious Crimes Unit be renewed so that they can concentrate on key
cases from the longer period of 1975-1999, and calls for a serious effort
on Indonesia's part to hold major perpetrators accountable as well.
Realistically, this will only happen if there is much stronger and more
consistent international pressure on Indonesia to live up to its earlier
commitment to pursue accountability domestically, as well as international support for an international accountability mechanism of some
kind if this does not occur.
Within Indonesia, however, the recent trend has been in the exact
opposite direction. In August 2004, an Indonesian court overturned
the convictions of four Indonesian security officials previously found
guilty of crimes against humanity in the violence in East Timor.1 6 No
reasons were given for the court's reversal. These acquittals mean that
no Indonesian security officials are serving time for the horrific vioagainst the East Timorese in the period
lence and brutality perpetrated
1 17
surrounding its referendum.

115. See Chega!:FinalReport of the CAVR supranote 7, pt. 11, at 23-25.
116. Evelyn Rush, Indonesia Court Voids 4 Convictions in 1999East TimorStrife, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
7, 2004, atA2.
117. In the end, all those tried before Indonesia's Ad Hoc Human Rights Court "were
acquitted either at trial or on appeal except for one, Eurico Guterres." Commission of Experts Report,
supra note 53, 171. Guterres, a former Timorese pro-Indonesian militia leader, began serving a
10-year sentence in May 2006. Shawn Donnan, Pro-JakartaMilitiaLeader Begins Sentence, FIN. TIMES,
May 4, 2006, availableat http://www.etan.org/et2OO6/may/O1/O4po-jhtm.The August 2004 acquittals
triggered sharply divergent reactions. They caused an outcry among human rights NGOs, both
domestic and international, and provoked strong statements by a number of governments. But
many Timorese officials took a very different view. Foreign Minister Ramos-Horta expressed
support for an international truth commission but opposed an international criminal tribunal.
Prosecution of Indonesian officials, he argued, could be destabilizing within Indonesia and would
undermine East Timor's efforts to improve its relations with Indonesia. Dan Eaton, East Timor
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Meanwhile, in East Timor, the capacity-building impact of the hybrid
tribunal, like its accountability record, has been mixed. Some valuable
experience clearly has been gained by Timorese judges serving on the
Special Panels and by Timorese investigators and prosecutors working
in the Serious Crimes Unit. Moreover, because Timoresejudges on the
trial and appellate panels are also part of the domestic justice system,
and likely will continue to serve there, their experience on the Special
Panels will be of direct benefit to the national courts. 118 This is valuable
capacity-building.
Nevertheless, language barriers among the national and international judges limited the opportunities for exchange of ideas and
mutual learning. Salary and support arrangements made Timorese
judges on the Special Panels sometimes feel like second-class citialso
zens. 119 An early lack of systematic and well-planned training 120
constrained the capacity-building potential of the hybrid tribunal.
On the prosecution side, few Timorese were integrated into top
positions in the serious crimes prosecutorial office. More generally, the
stark contrast in resources between the Serious Crimes Unit and East
Timor's "ordinary crimes" capacity presented a constant struggle for
East Timor's prosecutor-general, Longuinhos Monteiro, who headed
both components and whose five district prosecutors had no land

Urges End to Pushfor UN Tribuna REuTERS, Aug. 9, 2004; East Timor's ForeignMinister Opposes Rights
Tribuna4 ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 8, 2004. For a discussion and critique of the Indonesian
prosecutions before the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court, see Commission of Experts Report, supranote
53, at 38-80.
118. Although Timoresejudges failed their exams to move beyond probationary status, they
are engaged in intensive training programs and many passed their midterm evaluation. See DAviD
COHEN, EAST-WEST CENTER SPECIAL REPORT NO. 9, INDIFFERENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: THE UNITED

94 (2006), available at
http://eastwestcenter.org/stored/misc/SR00906Part4.pdf; Security Council, ProgressReport of the
Secretary-Generalon the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste, 19, U.N. Doc. S/2006/24 (Jan.17,
2006). See generally CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?, supra note 1, at 234-38 (discussing the challenges
facing East Timor'sjudicial system).
119. The United Nations paid the salaries of international judges, prosecutors, and investigators. Timorese counterparts were paid at local rates by the Timorese government. It was not so
much salary differentials but rather some differences in basic support--such as computers and
other resources-that grated on some Timorese judges, for instance. Interviews with Timorese
judges, in Dili, East Timor (Nov. 2003).
120. This has been a more general problem in the East Timorese judicial system. See
Katzenstein, supra note 100, at 265-68. See also REIGER & WIERDA, supra note 113, (offering a
thoughtful assessment of the limitations of the legacy and capacity-building of the Serious Crimes
Process in East Timor).
NATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN EAST TIMOR
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phone lines by which to communicate.121 Monteiro expressed concern
that when the tribunal's mandate ended (as it did in 2005) and the UN
departed, equipment and resources on which Timorese prosecutors in
the Serious Crimes Unit had come to depend would also leave with the
UN, despite the considerable domestic legal challenges that would
remain. 1 22 On the defense side, the capacity-building has been even
more limited. Internationals largely handled the defense in serious
crimes cases, while providing some training for Timorese public defenders. 123 In short, although some important local capacity-building clearly
has taken place, the potential offered by East Timor's hybrid arrangement has been realized only partially.
To sum up: The mixed results of East Timor's Special Panels reflect
the broader ambivalence of Timorese leaders, UN officials, and major
governments about pressing Indonesia too hard. Other goalsconsolidating independence, forging political and economic ties, resolving outstanding border issues, counterterrorism cooperation-have
consistently taken higher priority. Given how closely East Timor's fate is
tied to that of Indonesia, and taking into account the broader international unwillingness to pressure Jakarta, the path chosen by East
Timor's leaders is understandable. Nevertheless, disappointment within
East Timor about the limited accountability for the 1999 atrocities, and
more broadly for atrocities throughout the long Indonesian occupation, may fester unless more is done to seek meaningful accountability. 124 Furthermore, Indonesia's unwillingness to acknowledge the

121. Interview with Longuinhos Monteiro, Prosecutor-General, East Timor, in Dili, East

Timor (Nov. 2003).
122. Id. In the end, the UN-funded Serious Crimes Unit was able to investigate only less "than
half of the estimated 1450 murders committed in 1999." The Secretary-General, ProgressReport of
the Secretary-Generalon the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste, delivered to the Security Counci U.N.

Doc. S/2005/533, para. 49 (Aug. 18, 2005). Arrangements for storing the Serious Crime Unit's
original files in East Timor, and for storing a complete copy of these records at the United
Nations, were negotiated by the Timorese government and the UN. Id. at paras. 12-14. For
discussion of the conclusion of the tribunal's mandate, see supranote 104.
123. Katzenstein, supra note 100, at 263, 267. See also Commission of Experts Report, supra note
53, at 36-37.
124. As discussed below, many Timorese participating in the community-based reconciliation proceedings have expressed strong disappointment that many of those who committed
serious crimes have not been prosecuted at all. See Chega!: FinalReport of the CAVR, supranote 7, pt.
9, para. 170; ZiwcA, supranote 12, at41; Community ReconciliationProcess,supranote12, at 100-101;
Commissionof Experts Report, supra note 53, at 89 (citing a 2004 opinion poll in which "52 per cent of
the population responded that justice must be sought even if it slows down reconciliation with
Indonesia, while 39 per cent favoured reconciliation even if that meant significantly reducing
efforts to seek justice.").
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responsibility of specific Indonesian military leaders and militia forces
for the violence in East Timor perpetuates a pattern of impunity that
bodes poorly for its human rights accountability in other contexts.
Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the decision of
East Timor and Indonesia to establish a bilateral Commission of Truth
and Friendship (CTF) in late 2004 has evoked ambivalent responses
within East Timor. 125 According to its terms of reference, the CTF aims
to "resolve residual problems of the past" and to "establish the conclusive truth" regarding "the events prior to and immediately after the
popular consultations," including the "nature, causes and the extent"
of the human rights violations, and to do so through "a forward looking
and reconciliatory approach" that "will not lead to prosecution and will
emphasize institutional responsibilities."' 126 The CTF ultimately will
issue a report that will establish a "shared historical record" and
recommend measures to "heal the wounds of the past." Human rights
and victims groups in East Timor, however, have expressed deep
concern about aspects of the CTF's mandate, particularly the idea of
"amnesty for those involved in human rights violations who cooperate
fully in revealing the truth."' 2 7 There is also concern that the CTF will
face pressure from the Indonesian side not to call senior military
leaders, and that it will backtrack on what has already been accomplished thus far in documenting the historical record and issuing
indictments.
C.

East Timor's Innovative Community ReconciliationProcedures

Within East Timor, the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) may ultimately have the greater domestic impact,
particularly through its innovative community reconciliation procedures and through its comprehensive report and recommendations.
An independent body supported by voluntary contributions, the CAVR
included seven national commissioners and twenty-nine regional commissioners and was chaired by Aniceto Guterres Lopes, an accom-

125. The leaders of Indonesia and East Timor met in Bali on December 14, 2004 to establish
the Commission on Truth and Friendship. Information about the Commission, including its
terms of reference and members, is available on its website at http://www.ctf-ri-tl.org. The
Commission has ten members, five of whom are Indonesian and five Timorese, including the
Chair of East Timor's CAVR About Commission, http://www.ctf-ri-td.org (follow "About Commission" hyperlink).

126. Terms of Reference for the Commission of Truth and Friendship, paras. 7-14, available
at http://www.ctf-ri-tl.org (follow "Term of Reference" hyperlink).
127. Id. atpara. 14.

[Vol. 38

PURSUING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES AFTER CONFLICT

plished and widely respected Timorese human rights lawyer. 128 From
2001 until it completed its over-2000 page report in 2005, the Commission worked diligently to seek the truth regarding human rights
violations in East Timor during the period between April 1974 and
October 1999, reaching out to citizens throughout East Timor, gathering testimony from victims, and holding a series of major public
hearings. 129 The CAVR was also charged with assisting the reception
and reintegration of individuals into their communities after the long
period of political conflict in East Timor.
The Commission's community reconciliation process made a unique
contribution to this goal. The Commission's staff traveled throughout
the country to visit communities affected by violence during the
Indonesian occupation. Working with community leaders, the Commission established panels composed of a regional commissioner and local
leaders before which community-based reconciliation proceedings took
place. The involvement of traditional local leaders provided legitimacy
within communities, but the Commission also took pains to ensure that
women and young people were included in the process. 13 0 This helped
to empower some new voices in traditional community settings.
Under a carefully devised procedure, individuals who committed
lesser offenses-such as looting or minor assault-were able to acknowledge what they had done in a public hearing before their community,
express contrition, and enter into a "community reconciliation agreement" (CRA). Prosecutors in the Serious Crimes Unit reviewed written
statements from these individuals before the community hearings even
took place in order to determine whether the person was eligible to
participate or, instead, potentially liable for prosecution for more
serious crimes. Eligible individuals who concluded CRAs are immune
from civil liability or criminal prosecution for the acts underlying the
agreement. The CRAs were registered with district courts, however,

128. The Commission was supported by voluntary contributions from states, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals. Established by UNTAET in 2001, the Commission's mandate
was negotiated with Timorese leaders. See UNTAET Reg. 2001/10, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/
2001/10 (July 13, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/ReglOe.pdf;
Carsten Stahn, Accommodating Individual CriminalResponsibility and NationalReconciliation: The UN
Truth Commission for East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 952, 962 (2001). The commission was

headquartered at Dili's former Balide Prison, the site of horrific torture and atrocities during
Indonesian rule-a location that will become a museum after the commission's work is finished.
129. See Chega!:FinalReport of the CA R, supra note 7.
130. The CAVR followed the requirement of its mandate "that a minimum 30% of all
Regional Commissioners be women" and that community reconciliation panels have "appropriate
gender representation." Id. pt. 9, para. 154, at 43.
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providing a link to the formal justice system in the event of noncompliance.
The Commission received more than 1500 statements from individuals (called deponents) wishing to participate in the process. Ultimately,
1371 deponents completed the community reconciliation process, and
the CAVR estimates that up to 3000 more might have participated had
the process continued for a longer time. Over 40,000 Timoresenearly 5 percent of the total population-attended the community
hearings held throughout the country.'
These community reconciliation proceedings have had three results
or accomplishments, in the view of the Commission's chair, Aniceto
Guterres Lopes. 132 First, they helped to stabilize the situation in rural
areas after a very turbulent period. Second, they provided a sense of
justice processes in communities throughout the country that have
limited access to formal courts. The proceedings "reinforced the value
of the rule of law, and contributed to the fight against impunity by
resolving a significant number of cases that could not realistically have
been dealt with through the formal justice system.' 3 3 Third, the
community reconciliation process encouraged local cultural traditions
of reconciliation and conflict resolution. They also provided some
valuable mediation training and capacity-building to panel members
and other participants. These accomplishments are steps in building a
foundation for further development of the rule of law in East Timor.
Not surprisingly, the community-based reconciliation procedures
were more successful in some communities than in others. The hearings attracted significant numbers of people in many communities.
Some participants confessed to specific offenses such as looting, whereas
others acknowledged only a general association with Indonesian police
or authorities. Some community reconciliation agreements required
individuals to provide concrete restitution to victims-such as rebuilding a destroyed home, returning stolen goods, or repaying a victim for
lost livestock-or to engage in forms of community service such as
working on damaged school buildings or assisting orphanages or
churches.1 34 Many CRAs, however, simply involved a formal, public
apology before the community. 3 5 Some individuals seemed genuinely

131. Id., pt.9,at29,43,47.
132. Interview with Aniceto Guterres Lopes, Chair, CAVR, in Dili, East Timor (Nov. 2003).
133. Chega!: FinalReport of the CAVP, supra note 7, pt. 9, at 47.
134. Community ReconciliationProcess, supranote 12, at 56.
135. Id. As Zifcak explains, as the reconciliation process unfolded over time, "simply apology"
became more common as the basis of reconciliation agreements: "A straightforward apology

[Vol. 38

PURSUING A CCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES AFTER CONFIJCT

contrite in these reconciliation proceedings, others far less so. Thus,
the impact of the proceedings no doubt has varied in different communities and among different participants.
Most of the deponents who entered into community reconciliation
agreements have expressed clear satisfaction with the process. A number of former militia members, for instance, have felt that the procedures 6 helped them integrate more effectively into their communities.

13

The response among victims has been more mixed, however, for a
number of reasons. For some, the confessions of the deponents were
not as forthright as hoped for, and the CRAs in many cases were not
very demanding.1 3 7 Victims hoping for more information about the
fate of their loved ones were sometimes disappointed. Some victims
found the proceedings and the public apology before the community
to be constructive and affirming, but others felt a certain sense 13of
pressure or community expectation to reconcile with perpetrators. 1
The CAVR acknowledges that clearer guidelines regarding the role of
victims in the proceedings
and a greater focus on their needs would
13 9
have been beneficial.

Despite the range of reactions to the community reconciliation
procedures, they do seem to have brought some sense of justice
procedures to rural communities that have little access to the country's
formal justice system. The emphasis on confession, forgiveness, and
reconciliation also had deep cultural resonance in predominantly
Catholic East Timor. Problematic, however, is a lingering sense of
injustice and inequity that many Timorese feel because of the failure of
the Serious Crimes Unit and Special Panels to bring to justice many

embodied in a legal document signed by all parties combined with a commitment not to take part
in any similar activities became, then, the quickest and easiest means of obtaining some form of
closure, which in turn signaled 'success.'" ZIFCAK, supra note 12, at 22. For additional reflections
on why only apology was required in many CRAs, see Chega!:FinalReportof the CA VR supra note 7,

pt. 9, at 33.
136. Community Reconciliation Process, supra note 12, at 81; Chega!: Final Report of the CAV,

supranote 7, pt. 9, at 33-34.
137. Community ReconciliationProcess, supranote 12, at 81-83; ZIFCAK, supra note 12, at 20-22,
25--26.
138. ZIFCAX, supranote 12, at 20-22, 25-26; Chega!:FinalReport of the CA VR, supra note 7, pt. 9,
para. 132, at 39.
139. Chega!: Final Report of the CAVR supra note 7, pt. 9, para. 133, at 39 (noting that
"[g]uidelines establishing a right of victims to a say in the decision on what 'acts of reconciliation'
the perpetrator should perform, and a stronger place for victims in the formal decision-making
structure of the CRP would have helped to ensure that their interests were not overlooked").
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who committed more serious offenses. For many Timorese, support
for the community reconciliation process was tied to expectations
that serious offenders living within their communities would be
brought to justice. Yet the vast majority have not been investigated
or charged. When lesser offenders conclude reconciliation agreements but more serious offenders often face no process at all, the
deficit" disappoints public expectations of fair
resulting 'justice
140
accountability.

Unfortunately, the circumstances surrounding the release of the
CAVR's final report also created a sense of injustice in East Timor. In
late 2005, the CAVR completed and presented its report to President
Gusmao, who subsequently presented it to the Timorese parliament.
But, as of February 2006, the report had not been publicly released
within East Timor, despite the fact that it had been presented to UN
Secretary-General Annan and was available in full or in part on various
international Web sites. 141 The fact that the report had not yet been
presented publicly in East Timor-when it was otherwise widely available-was perplexing and upsetting to many Timorese human rights
and victims organizations and to members of the public. Subsequently,
although violence in the country delayed the efforts, the post-CAVR
secretariat worked hard to disseminate the report throughout all the
districts of East Timor by the end of 2006. Also, by late 2006, the CAVR
posted the full report on its official website in three languages (English,
Bahasa Indonesia, and Portuguese), with the introduction and executive summary available in Tetum. 1 42 The extent to which the Commis-

140. For analysis of this problem, see Chega!:FinalReport of the CAVR supranote 7, pt. 9, para.
170, at 48; ZIFcAK, supra note 12, at 41; Community ReconciliationProcess, supranote 12, at 100-101.
Less than half of the 1450 murders estimated to have been committed in 1999 were ultimately
investigated by the Serious Crimes Unit. The Secretary-General, ProgressReport of the SecretaryGeneral on the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste, 1 49, submitted to the Security Counci4 U.N. Doc.
S/2005/533 (Aug. 18, 2005).
141. The commission submitted its report on October 31, 2005 to President Gusmao, who
presented it to East Timor's parliament and cabinet in November 2005. Amnesty Int'l, Timor-Leste:
Denial ofJustice?, AI Index ASA 57/005/2005, Nov. 29, 2005. In January 2006, President Gusmao
presented the report to UN Secretary-General Annan. Gusmao PresentsAnnan with Report on East
Timor Atrocities, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 20, 2006, available at http://www.etan.org/et2006/
january/14/20ri.htm#Gusmao%20presents. Yet, as of February 2006, the report had not been
publicly released in East Timor, even though the CAVR's mandate provides that the report "shall
be immediately available to the public and shall be published in the Official Gazette." UNTAET
Reg. 2001/10, supranote 128, at § 21.3. The report has been available in full on the Web site of the
International Center for Transitional Justice since January 30, 2006. See http://www.ictj.org, in
English and Bahasa Indonesia.
142. See CAVR-Homepage, http://www.cavr-timorleste.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
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sion's important and innovative recommendations are taken up by the
Timorese government and by other states remains to be seen.
D.

Sierra Leone's Special Court:A PromisingHybrid

Though it faces many challenges, Sierra Leone's Special Court is
probably the criminal tribunal that has been best able, thus far, to
begin realizing in practice the potential benefits of a hybrid accountability mechanism. The tribunal has made a reasonably strong start in its
primary mission of seeking justice and accountability for the brutal
atrocities that marked Sierra Leone's decade-long civil war-a war that
claimed the lives of an estimated 75,000 people and displaced a third of
the country's population. 143 Two major trials began in summer 2004.
These include the trial of three leaders of the Revolutionary United
Front ("RUF") who are accused of horrific crimes against humanity
and war crimes, including terrorizing the civilian population, rape,
murder, amputations, abduction of women into forced "marriages,"
and forced recruitment of child soldiers. 1 44 Also on trial are three
leaders of the Civilian Defense Forces ("CDF") who are on trial for
multiple counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including
murder, inhumane acts, terrorizing the civilian population, and conscripting child soldiers. 1 45 A third trial against three members of the

143. INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: THE FIRST
EIGHTEEN MONTHS 1 (2004), availableat http://www.ict.org/images/content/1/0/104.pdf. For a
discussion of the conflict, see Avril D. Haines, Accountability in Sierra Leone: The Role of the Special
Court, in ACCOUNTABILrlY FOR ATROCITIES, supranote 13, at 176-92.
144. The RUF leaders on trial are Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine Gbao. See
http://www.sc-sl.org/RUF.html. In his opening statement, Special Court prosecutor David Crane
described a meeting on February 27, 1991, in which Liberia's Charles Taylor, along with RUF
General Foday Sankoh and others, planned the invasion of Sierra Leone and the capture of its
diamond-rich areas--an invasion that set in motion the devastating decade-long conflict in Sierra
Leone. Transcript of Trial at 22, The Prosecutor of the Special Court of Sierra Leone v. Issa
Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine Gbao, (Special Court of Sierra Leone July 5, 2004)
(No. SCSL-04-15-T), available athttp://www.sc-sl.org/Transcripts/RUF-070504.pdf.
145. Sam Hinga Norman, former Commander of the Civilian Defense Force (CDF) and
former Deputy Defense Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs, was one of the three accused in
this case. The other two accused are Allieu Kondewa and Moinina Fofana. The Prosecutor of the
Special Court of Sierra Leone v. Sam Hinga Norman, Allieu Kondewa and Moinina Fofana,
(Special Court of Sierra LeoneJune 3, 2004) (No. SCSL-04-14-T), availableat http://www.sc-sl.org/
CDF.html. The three members of the AFRC on trial are Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara,
and Santigie Borbor Kanu. The Prosecutor of the Special Court of Sierra Leone v. Alex Tamba
Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara, and Santigie Borbor Kanu, (Special Court of Sierra Leone Mar. 7,
2005) (No. SCSL-04-16-T), availableat http://www.sc-sl.org/AFRC.html.
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Armed Forces Revolutionary Council ("AFRC") for similar crimes
began in March 2005. One year later, in March 2006, former Liberian
President Charles Taylor was finally taken into custody by the Special
Court, where he stands charged with eleven counts of crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law, including terrorizing the civilian population, mur1 46
der, rape, sexual slavery, and use of child soldiers.
The Special Court, established in 2002 by agreement between the
government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations, was a deliberate
effort to design a tribunal that could overcome some of the limitations
of purely international or purely domestic proceedings. 147 In many
ways, the Court's structure and mandate reflected the lessons-the
"accountability learning curve"-of the previous decade. As a hybrid
tribunal supported by the United Nations-with both international
and domestic judges, prosecutors, investigators, defense counsel, and
administrators-the Special Court has greater resources and credibility
than Sierra Leone's struggling domestic justice system. 14 8 Yet the
Court's physical location in Sierra Leone, with nationals participating
in each of its components, provides important opportunities for building domestic capacity-and for extensive outreach efforts designed to
deepen public understanding and expectations of accountability and
fairjustice, producing a more direct impact on the local population. In
contrast to the enormous expense and open-ended time frames of the
ICTY and ICTR, Sierra Leone's Special Court has a mandate focused
on those who bear "the greatest responsibility" for serious violations of
international humanitarian law. The Court's original prosecutor, David
Crane, argued this mandate is manageable and achievable in a time

146. For a copy of Taylor's indictment and a summary of the charges against him see the web
site of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.org/Taylor.html. Taylor was taken into
custody by the Special Court on March 29, 2006, and was arraigned on April 3, 2006. His trial is
due to begin inJune 2007.
147. The court's design also reflected political compromises as, for example, in the time
frame of its jurisdiction. Haines, supra note 143, at 214-15. See alsoJ. Peter Pham, Politics and
InternationalJusticein a World of States, 4 HUM. RTs. & HUM. WELFARE 119, 131-32 (2004).
148. The court has primacy over Sierra Leone's domestic courts and is a "mixed" or "hybrid"
tribunal in at least two ways: its staff includes both international and national personnel, and it has
authority to prosecute certain offenses under international law and under Sierra Leonean law. As
a treaty-based court explicitly empowered to try those bearing "the greatest responsibility for
violations of international humanitarian law" committed in Sierra Leone since November 30,
1996, the tribunal can prosecute those shielded from domestic prosecution by the amnesty of the
1999 Lome Agreement. Haines, supra note 143, at 213.
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frame that should allow both justice 1to
be done and wounds to begin to
49
heal as Sierra Leone moves forward.
The Special Court has faced some but not all of the practical
challenges of earlier hybrid tribunals. Maintaining adequate and reliable funding has been an ongoing concern, because the Special Court
depends primarily on voluntary donations. 150 Nevertheless, starting up
its operations with voluntary rather than UN-assessed funding actually
proved to be beneficial because it gave the Court flexibility in hiring,
enabling it to assemble an extremely talented staff very quickly. The
Court has also managed to blend national and international staff quite
well,15 1 avoiding some of the disparities in salaries and support that
created tensions, for instance, in East Timor. 152 Language barriers

between international and national staff have not been an issue here,
so easier exchange and give-and-take between staff is more possible.
The Special Court's Defense Office also represents an important (and
earlier) effort to achieve greater equality between the prosecution and
the defense lacking in other tribunals. 153 Still, the many practical

149. Interview with David Crane, Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Freetown,
Sierra Leone (June 2004). Crane argued that the mandate, in his view, was achievable within a
time frame of three to five years. Id. See also David M. Crane, Dancingwith the Devil: Prosecuting West
Africa's Warlords, Current Lessons Learned and Challenges, in COLLOQUIUM OF PROSECUTORS OF

(2004) [hereinafter Crane, Dancing], http://
69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/colloquiumO4/Crane.htm.
150. For instance, insufficient voluntary contributions led to a budget shortfall of about U.S.
$20 million in the tribunal's third year of operations, requiring a one-time UN contribution of
over $16 million. Commission of Experts Report, supra note 53, para. 103, at 29.
151. Each of the Special Court's four components-chambers, office of the prosecutor,
defense office, and registry-is an interesting blend of international and national staff. As of
February 2006, for example, the three-member Trial Chambers I and II together included a total
of six judges: a Sierra Leonean national and a Samoan national each appointed by the government of Sierra Leone, and nationals of Northern Ireland, Cameroon, Uganda, and Canada
appointed by U.N. Secretary-General Annan. The Special Court for Sierra Leone-Chambers,
http://www.sc-sl.org/chambers.html. The Appeals Chamber included five judges: a Sierra Leonean and a British/Australian jurist, both appointed by Sierra Leone, and three judges-a
Nigerian, a Sri Lankan, and an Austrian-appointed by the Secretary-General. Id. The Special
Court's first prosecutor was an American and, by June 2004, approximately 50 percent of the
prosecutor's office (which includes investigators) was Sierra Leonean. The first registrar was an
experienced British court administrator. The head of outreach is a Sierra Leonean, as are almost
all of her staff. The defense office, an innovative component of the court, includes as part of its
structure three duty counsel (two were Sierra Leonean and one Gambian, as ofJune 2004). Id.
152. The fact that living allowances for local Sierra Leonean jurists are less than for
international judges has nevertheless been criticized by some Sierra Leoneans.
153. The Special Court's registrar, Robin Vincent, was a strong early advocate of establishing
a defense component modeled on a public defender's office. His evaluation of the ICTR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, ARUsHA 4-5
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disparities between support for
the prosecution and for the defense
54
have been a continuing issue.1
Sierra Leone's Special Court is very much a work in progress, so it is
too early to determine whether, in fact, it will ultimately succeed in
delivering meaningful justice to the people of Sierra Leone or in
helping to improve domestic capacity for fairjustice and the rule of law.
A number of positive signs already exist, but there are also areas of
concern. In any event, the theoretical benefits of an in-country hybrid
do not flow automatically; they require astute planning, considerable
resources, and sensitivity to the many practical and political challenges
that can arise when a tribunal locates directly in the country most
155
affected by the atrocities.

So far, the glass is at least half full. By indicting those who bear the
greatest responsibility for starting and orchestrating the brutal conflict
in Sierra Leone, the tribunal helped to disempower and prevent them
from committing such atrocities again. Sierra Leoneans agree to a
remarkable extent who these people are. In outreach meetings all
across the country held by the Special Court's prosecutor, Sierra
Leoneans put former Liberian president Charles Taylor at the top of
the list. He was followed by two others: RUF commander Foday Sankoh
and General Sam Bockarie. All three have been indicted, but only
Taylor is still alive to stand trial. (Sankoh died of natural causes in
custody; Bockarie and his family were killed in Liberia, allegedly on
Taylor's orders. 156)

influenced his views about the need for a more robust defense capacity in Sierra Leone. At Sierra
Leone's Special Court, duty counsel in the defense office assist defendants before they have
obtained independent counsel; they also provide research support to defense counsel and assist in
building a defense and formulating arguments. In addition, the defense office has established a
list of qualified defense counsel, and it administers contracts for attorneys appointed to represent
indigent defendants and for defense investigators. Still, the Court's administrators will frankly
acknowledge that they wish they had built up the defense office earlier and provided it with a
greater budget. Nevertheless, it is a considerable and dramatic improvement over the limited
support offered to the defense in other tribunals, both hybrid and international.
154. See James Cockayne, The FrayingShoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 669-74 (2005).
155. See, e.g., id. at 674-75.
156. The chief of investigations for the Special Court stated in May 2003 that he had
.credible information" that Bockarie's family had been killed on orders from Taylor, which "casts
serious doubts about [Taylor's] claims regarding the circumstances of Sam Bockarie's death."
Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Bockarie's Family Alleged
Murdered; Office of the Prosecutor Demands Full Cooperation from Taylor (May 15, 2003),
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Press/prosecutor-051503.html. See also U.S. State Dep't, Bureau
of Intelligence & Research, Background Note on Sierra Leone, (May 2006), available at http://
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Charles Taylor presents the biggest challenge in the struggle for
accountability and for peace in West Africa. Virtually everyone agrees
that he bears the greatest responsibility for the violence that engulfed
Sierra Leone and much of the rest of West Africa. Preventing him from
ever again exercising power directly in Liberia-or behind the
scenes-is a critical goal in bringing lasting peace to the region.
Throughout Sierra Leone, people overwhelmingly support prosecuting him before the Special Court. 157 For two and a half years, however,
Taylor was in Nigeria under a grant of asylum brokered as part of his
departure from power in Liberia. During this period, the Nigerian
government, along with some other African and international leaders,
resisted handing Taylor over, arguing that to do so would undermine
future negotiated departures of dictators as a way to end conflicts.15 8
Others, in contrast, argued strongly that ending the impunity of
high-level leaders for atrocities-such as those of which Taylor is
accused-is an essential step in preventing their recurrence in the
region. 159 In the end, as international pressure grew for holding Taylor
to account, and after a newly elected government in Liberia called for
his prosecution, Nigeria handed Taylor over to the Special Court in
March 2006.
As Taylor arrived and was taken into custody in Sierra Leone,
hundreds of Sierra Leoneans gathered in the hills of Freetown near the
Special Court to commemorate the dramatic day. At that moment,
whether Taylor's trial would occur in Sierra Leone, as many hoped, or
instead would take place in The Hague before a panel of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone assembled there, had not yet been determined.
Taylor's trial raised issues of security and stability as a result of his role
in West Africa's conflicts. In the end, the Special Court and the
government of Sierra Leone requested that his trial be held at The
Hague, and Taylor was transferred there in June 2006.
Although it has made considerable progress, the Special Court faces

www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm (stating Taylor "probably" directed Bockarie's killing to
keep him from testifying).
157. Sierra Leone's Parliament in February 2006 unanimously adopted a resolution calling
for Taylor's trial before the Special Court. See Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Office
of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor Welcomes Sierra Leone Parliamentary Resolution Supporting
Taylor's Trial at the Special Court (Feb. 9, 2006), availableat http://www.sc-sl.org/Press/prosecutor-

020906.pdf.
158. For discussion of the controversy over the Special Court's unveiling of the sealed
indictment against Taylor during a peace negotiation in Ghana and subsequent differences of
view over Nigeria's offer of amnesty to Taylor, see Pham, supra note 147, at 131-33.
159. See Zainab Bangura, Op-Ed., Flouting the Rule of Law, WASH. PosT, June 25, 2004, at A29.
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some distinct challenges in demonstrating meaningful accountability
for atrocities to the people of Sierra Leone. To demonstrate credibly
that justice is fair, the court's proceedings must be widely viewed as
legitimate both in terms of their substance (who is being prosecuted
for what offenses) and in terms of process. The fact that the prosecution indicted Charles Taylor as well as leaders from all the major groups
in Sierra Leone's conflict-the RUF, the AFRC, and the CDF-is
important in demonstrating that no one is above the law and in
avoiding the perception of "victor's justice."
Still, there are difficult, lingering issues that may affect the perceived
legitimacy of the trials among the Sierra Leonean population. For one,
Charles Taylor's long-awaited prosecution before the Special Court has
raised public expectations of accountability that may be disappointed,
at least to some extent, by the decision to hold the trial outside of Sierra
Leone, thus making the proceedings less accessible to the local population. 160 Second, the trial of CDF leader and former Interior Minister
Sam Hinga Norman generated controversy, at least initially, because
many regarded him as a hero who acted to defend Sierra Leone from
the RUF. The court's outreach staff had to work hard to explain that he
was being tried for serious atrocities in violation of international
law-that regardless of one's cause, there are clear limits on how one
can fight. Third, many Sierra Leoneans express frustration that many
individuals who did the actual chopping, raping, and killing remain
free. As one amputee put it, "the person who chopped off my hand lives
down the street; if there is no justice, my children may seek vengeance." 161 Or as one local TVjournalist, critical of the peacekeeping
forces of the Economic Community of West African States, exclaimed:
"ECOMOG forces killed my brother and raped my sister, so why aren't
they being tried?, 16 2 In other words, although Sierra Leoneans support
trying those who bear "the greatest responsibility" for the atrocities,
there remains frustration that other, lower-level offenders are not

160. SeeJohn E. Leigh, Op-Ed., Bringing It All Back Home, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 17, 2006, at A25.
Leigh, who is Sierra Leone's former ambassador to the United States, argues that transferring
Taylor to The Hague for trial "would defeat a principal purpose behind the establishment of the
special court in Sierra Leone-namely, to teach Africans, firsthand and in their own countries, the
fundamentals ofjustice and to drive home that no one is above the law." Id.
161. Notes from Town Hall Meeting, Amputee Association, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (june,
2004).
162. Interview with TVJournalist, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (June 2004). ECOMOG is the
acronym for forces of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that deployed
to Sierra Leone in response to the conflict. See ECOMOG: Peacekeeperor Participant
?, BBC NEWSFiLE,
Feb. 11, 1998, availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/55719.stm.
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being held accountable as well.
The Special Court's processes also need to be perceived as fair to
credibly demonstrate a norm of accountability and impartial justice.
The fact that both international and national jurists and staff participate in the work of the Special Court has enhanced its legitimacy
among the local population. But even so, the Special Court's local
outreach officers have encountered skepticism in both directions:
some Sierra Leoneans, based on negative perceptions of the country's
own judicial system, needed reassurance that the Sierra Leoneanjurists
on the court would, in fact, be impartial; others wondered whether the
court was being forced upon Sierra Leone by international actors. Still,
the tribunal seems to enjoy considerable support and legitimacy in
163
Sierra Leone.
To sustain this support, the tribunal needs to conduct demonstrably
fair trials. The prosecution team is extremely skilled and well resourced. A significant concern is whether defense counsel will be
effective enough and have sufficient resources to mount a high-quality
defense or to effectively assist defendants who opt to represent themselves, such as former Interior Minister Sam Hinga Norman, who died
in February 2007 before his trial concluded. 164 Ensuring that the
defense has the personnel and resources to present a credible defense
will be important to the legitimacy of the proceedings. Beyond the issue
of a technically skilled defense, whether Sierra Leoneans ultimately will
regard the Special Court as demonstrating meaningful accountability
and fair justice will depend on whether they are convinced-through
outreach and other efforts-that defendants such as Sam Hinga Norman are fairly and appropriately tried for conduct that violates agreed
rules. 165 Finally, the trial of Charles Taylor raises a whole host of issues
that will demand an extremely disciplined handling of the proceedings

163. For example, in one poll conducted by the Campaign for Good Governance, a Sierra
Leonean NGO, before the trials even began, 67 percent of those surveyed had heard of the court,
62 percent found it necessary, and 61 percent thought the court was intended to benefit the
people of Sierra Leone. SeeInt'l Crisis Group, The Special CourtforSierraLeone: Promisesand Pitfallsof
a "New Model" 17, Africa Briefing No. 16, Aug. 4, 2003, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/
home/index.cfm?id= 1803&1= 1.
164. Sam Hinga Norman died on February 22, 2007 in a Senegalise hospital following
surgery and before a verdict was issued in his case. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone,
Court Indictee Sam Hinga Norman Dies in Dakar (Feb. 22, 2007), availableat http://www.sc-sl.org/
Press/pressrelease-022207.pdf.
165. For a skeptical assessment emphasizing the political nature of accountability proceedings, see Tim Kelsall, Politics, Anti-Politics, International Justice: Notes on the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (Oct. 15, 2004) (submitted at the conference "Settling Accounts: Truth,Justice and
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by the Special Court's judiciary. The tumultous trials of former leaders
Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein have made clear that such
proceedings face the ever-present risk of turning into highly-charged
political drama, and thus require judges who can walk a fine line
between protecting the accused's rights to speak and maintaining
courtroom dignity, order, and efficiency.
1. Outreach: Demonstrating Accountability and FairJustice
Even though Charles Taylor's trial poses special challenges, it also
provides a long-awaited opportunity to demonstrate meaningful accountability and fair justice to the people of Sierra Leone. In fact,
systematic outreach to the population of Sierra Leone has been central
to the Special Court's work from the very beginning. In September
2002, shortly after he arrived in Freetown, prosecutor David Crane
began traveling throughout the country to hear what the Sierra Leonean people had to say about who bore "the greatest responsibility" for
the atrocities committed during the brutal conflict. A month later, the
office of the prosecutor and the registry conducted outreach together.
In the spring of 2003, a chief of outreach was hired, and the outreach
office, under the registry, now also has ten district offices throughout
Sierra Leone. This substantial outreach program has been vital in
engaging the Sierra Leonean people in the work of the court and
stands in contrast to the lack of systematic outreach in other postconflict contexts.
The explicit goal of the Special Court's countrywide outreach program is to "promote understanding of the Special Court and respect
for human rights and the rule of law in Sierra Leone." 166 Thus, in
addition to providing basic information about the court-how it came
about, its authority, structure and procedures, who is indicted for what
offenses, and an update on the trials-the outreach office raises
broader issues. In community town hall meetings and focused workshops around the country, outreach officers aim to demonstrate and
illustrate, based on the actual proceedings before the court, that no
one is above the law, that law can and should be fair, and ultimately that

Redress in Post-Conflict Societies," Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs, Harvard
University, Nov. 1-3, 2004).
166. Special Court for Sierra Leone, Outreach Mission Statement. See also UNIV. CAL.
BERKELEY WAR CRIMES STUDIES CENTER, INTERIM REPORT ON THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 33,
n.153 (2005) (citing an interview with the head of the Outreach section, Apr. 8, 2005).
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the rule of law is more powerful than the rule of the gun. 167 In a society
with limited mass media and a strong oral tradition, these meetings are
critical to convey the importance of accountability.
Outreach meetings and workshops frequently involve lively, intense,
and wide-ranging conversations on vital, difficult issues. The court's
outreach officers work hard, for example, to explain what "fair justice"
looks like. A prosecution and defense before an impartial tribunal is an
important concept to convey to a population deeply skeptical of the
fairness of justice systems and inclined, from bitter experience, to
believe that people are simply "on the take." The outreach staff uses the
concrete cases before the Special Court to illustrate key principles. For
instance, when the appellate chamber ruled that Charles Taylor was
not entitled to immunity from prosecution as head of state, this
illustrated the concept that no one is above the law. The indictment
and trial of former Interior Minister Sam Hinga Norman-controversial in some quarters-illustrated, the outreach officers stressed, that
the Special Court is not a court controlled by the government. When
pressed-as they often are-by victims who ask why the person who
chopped off their hand is not being prosecuted, the outreach staff
discusses the principle of command responsibility to explain that
somebody is answering for the crime. These discussions-led by dynamic Sierra Leonean outreach officers-are often not easy, but they
do wrestle forthrightly with the difficult challenges of justice and
accountability.
There is no doubt that these outreach efforts are having an impact.
In a society where travel to rural areas is difficult and access to media is
limited, the outreach staff has reached out to engage the population on
critically important issues. An early opinion poll indicated that significant majorities were aware of the court and viewed its work positively.1 68 As the three combined trials of RUF, CDF, and AFRC leaders
have proceeded, moreover, the Special Court's public affairs office has
produced weekly audio summaries highlighting critical developments

167. With a chief of outreach and substantial staff in Freetown and ten district offices, the
Special Court's outreach office conducts its outreach in a variety of ways. These include
"community townhall meetings," held after making arrangements with local chiefs; workshops for
special groups (for instance, school pupils and university students, military forces, police, market
women, victims, ex-combatants, youths, teachers); and radio discussion programs, among others.
Sierra Leonean outreach officers lead these discussions in the local dialects that allow them to best
communicate with the participants. Interviews with Binta Mansaray, Chief of Outreach, and with
district outreach officers, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (June 2004). See also Special Court for Sierra
Leone--Outreach, http://www.sc-sl.org/outreach.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
168. Seelnt'l Crisis Group, supra note 163, at 17.
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in the proceedings, which are widely broadcast over the radio throughout Sierra Leone.
The outreach and public affairs efforts have not been immune from
criticism. Some members of the defense staff at the Special Court have
expressed frustration that they have not had more opportunity to
engage in outreach, particularly after the early efforts by the prosecution. 169 The weekly radio broadcasts of trial proceedings have not been
as frequent as some observers would like. And the ability of most Sierra
Leoneans to actually attend Special Court proceedings in the capital
remains limited, despite court-sponsored programs to bring groups of
citizens to Freetown to attend the trials.170 As outreach efforts continue, additional survey research hopefully will
enable fuller analysis of
1 71
work.
its
and
Court
the
of
perceptions
public
Ultimately, whether the demonstration effects of the trials-and the
outreach office's efforts to convey norms of accountability and fair
justice throughout the country-will have a longer-term impact within
Sierra Leone remains to be seen and is linked to the broader issue of
capacity-building and institutionalization of accountability norms.
2.

Capacity-Building in Sierra Leone

The Special Court, by virtue of its location and substantial local
participation, is in a position to help build domestic capacity directly by
increasing the skills and experience of local professionals. The Sierra
Leoneans who work at the court as prosecutors, investigators, defense
counsel, judges, administrators, outreach officers, and other staff are
learning a great deal about international humanitarian law and its basic
principles, about the conduct of fair trials, and about substantive issues
in their specific areas of responsibility. Interactions between international and national staff are a valuable two-way street of mutual learning-as the international investigators who work hand-in-hand with
their Sierra Leonean counterparts are the first to attest. The unanswered question, however, is how many of the local judges, prosecutors,
defense counsel, investigators, and other court staff actually will remain

169. Cockayne, supranote 154, at 672-73.
170. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BRINGINGJUSTICE: THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: ACCESSI-

2 (2004), availableat http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sierraleoneO904/8.htm.
171. The European Union has provided some funds to the Court for survey research. Tom
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PERRIELLO & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSrrIONALJusTICE, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA
LEONE UNDER SCRUTINY 37 (2006), available at http://www.ict.org/static/Prosecutions/Sierra.
study.pdf. Perriello and Wierda provide helpful analysis of the Court's outreach efforts, legacy,
and public perceptions of the Court. Id. at 35-40.
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in Sierra Leone after the court completes its work-and consequently
continue to use their valuable skills in the national justice system.
The Special Court engages in a second kind of capacity-building,
namely, working with NGOs that share a common commitment to
accountability. By linking up with organizations committed to advancing fundamental human rights principles, the court can potentially
have larger ripple effects within Sierra Leone and help to educate and
empower citizens and civil society organizations more broadly.
Two examples illustrate these effects. First, the Special Court's
outreach officers worked hard to help establish "Accountability Now
Clubs" across the country-clubs of university students to discuss issues
of accountability, justice, human rights, and good governance, with the
expectation that club members will visit secondary and elementary
schools to address these issues and communicate the critical importance of accountability past, present, and future.1 72 Second, the outreach staff, along with other court personnel, participate in the Special
Court Interactive Forum, a gathering of local and international NGOs
that focus primarily on the work of the court and how it can be
improved, but that also can network on additional accountability and
human rights issues.
Finally, the Special Court is in a position to contribute expertise and
training to Sierra Leone's domesticjustice system. International investigators at the Special Court, for instance, have trained a number of
Sierra Leonean police officers in witness management and protection-a critical issue given the long-term dangers that witnesses take on
in coming forward to testify before the Special Court. A number of the
court's judges and other legal professionals have lectured on law
reform and related topics at local universities and bar associations.
More generally, the Special Court has worked with the Sierra Leone
Bar Association and with various organizations, both domestic and
international, to identify and develop prqiects aimed at "helping to
rebuild a devastated judiciary."' 73 The Special Court's resources and
the time of its personnel are understandably focused on its core
mission of trying those who bear the greatest responsibility for the
atrocities committed in Sierra Leone; but there is no doubt that more
systematic efforts to provide training and to share expertise with

172. See Special Court for Sierra Leone-Outreach, http://www.sc-sl.org/outreach.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
173. Crane, Dancingwith theDevi4 supra note 149, at 6-7.
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participants in the local justice system would be beneficial.1 74 Through
its Legacy Working Group, the Special Court is working to identify
and
1 75
effect.
lasting
a
have
to
designed
projects
of
number
a
carry out
In the end, whether the Special Court's capacity-building effortsthe professional skills development of its own staff, the ripple effects of
working with local NGOs, and the training and sharing of expertise
with local jurists and legal personnel-will make a lasting and sustainable impact on Sierra Leone's domestic justice system and political
culture will depend on longer-term reforms within Sierra Leone. The
jury clearly is still out on this, and the challenges are immense. Still, the
degree of outreach and serious dialogue about accountability that the
Special Court has inspired is impressive and has indeed sent some
ripples of hope through Sierra Leonean society. But the enormous
challenge of institutionalizing principles of accountability-including
strengthening a weak and underresourced domestic justice system and
addressing deep and pervasive problems of corruption and governance-ultimately will determine how sustainable these efforts prove
to be.
E.

SierraLeone's Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Sierra Leone's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) highlighted these broader challenges in its final report. The commission
focused on the deeper and more systemic causes of grievance in Sierra
Leone-such as lack of transparency and accountability in the use of
governmental power, few opportunities for young people, and perva-

174. Ajoint UNDP/ICTJ report recommended that as part of its "legacy" efforts, the Special
Court should focus additional attention on substantive law reform in Sierra Leone, on professional development for domestic justice personnel, and on programs to raise greater awareness in
the provinces of the Special Court as an example of fair, effective legal process. INT'L CIR. FOR
TRANsrnoNALJUSTICE & U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 23, at 1-2. The Special Court's
outreach staff has provided training, for instance, to lay personnel working in the customary law
system. Interview with Binta Mansaray, Director of Outreach, Special Court for Sierra Leone, in
Freetown, Sierra Leone (June 2004). Working together with the UN Development Programme,

the Special Court's outreach staff offered training on fundamental human rights principles to lay
magistrates, court clerks, court bailiffs, and other participants in the customary law system. Id. The
outreach staff provided information on the Special Court and linked principles that are supposed
to govern the application of customary law ("equity, good conscience, and natural justice") to
human rights principles of equality, independence, and impartiality. Id. Developing a fairer, more
transparent, more equitable system of dispute settlement in the customary law system remains a
very long-term challenge, however. Id.
175. Vincent 0. Nmehielle & Charles ChernorJalloh, The Legacy of the Special Courtfor Sierra

Leone, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., 107, 111-22 (2006).
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sive corruption. 176 Stressing that many of these causes of conflict have
not yet been addressed adequately, the commission recommended
reforms to strengthen Sierra Leone's legal and political system, including greater transparency and public access
to information and greater
77
accountability of government officials.'
As in East Timor, Sierra Leone's TRC gained significant national
participation in its work, collecting over 8000 statements from civilians
and combatants in Sierra Leone and neighboring countries. 17 8 Local
NGOs and human rights leaders supported creation of the TRC, in part
to address the complexity of the conflict and its devastating effects,
including on children who often were victimized and forced to take up
arms. A Sierra Leonean NGO estimates that up to 70 percent of
combatants were children.' 79 Moreover, 72 percent of combatants
claimed to have been forcibly conscripted, with more than 80 percent
of the female soldiers reporting that status. i80 The Special Court's
prosecutor made clear early on that he did not intend to prosecute
child soldiers, so other approaches to accountability-such as the
TRC's emphasis on truth-telling, restorativejustice, and reconciliationwere a means to engage this large and significant group of former
combatants and to provide a forum for addressing the needs of
victims.""
At least in some areas, the commission had some success in promoting community-based healing ceremonies and in helping to reintegrate

176. The commission emphasized that "it was years of bad governance, endemic corruption
and the denial of basic human rights that created the deplorable conditions that made conflict
inevitable," that "[d] emocracy and the rule of law were dead" by the start of the conflict, and that
only the "slightest spark" was required for "violence to be ignited." WITNESS TO TRUTH, supra note
17, vol. 1, intro., para. 11. Sierra Leone's TRC submitted its report to the Security Council in
October 2004, and the report is available at http://www.trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/
index.shtml.

177.

WITNESS TO TRUTH,

178.

INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION

supra note 17, at vol. 1,intro, para. 12.

COMMISSION: REVIEWING THE FIRsTYEAR

3 (2004), availableat http://www.ic.org/images/content/
1/0/100.pdf; INT'L CRIsts GROUP, supra note 163, at 10.
179. POST-CoNFLICT REINTEGRATION INITIATIVE FOR DEV. & EMPOWERMENT, EX-COMBATANT
VIEWS OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION AND THE SPECIAL COURT OF SIERRA LEONE 13

(2002), availableathttp://www.ictj.org/images/content/0/9/090.pdf.
180. Id.
181. The TRC and the Special Court operated concurrently and tensions developed between
the two bodies on various matters, highlighting the need for careful planning regarding the
relationship between such different accountability mechanisms. In the case of East Timor, the
relationship between the Special Panels and the CAVR was addressed much more systematically
and was more constructive.
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perpetrators into society through symbolic acts of reconciliation.
Moreover, in response to the specific concerns and needs of victims,

the commission recommended a reparations program that would
include free health care to amputees, war wounded, and victims of
sexual violence; monthly pensions; and free education to the senior
secondary level for specific groups affected by the conflict, such as
amputees, children of amputees, children who were abducted
or
18 3
conscripted, victims of sexual violence, and others groups.
But the impact of the TRC remains uncertain and contested. No
government reparations program had yet been implemented as of late
2006. Moreover, some scholars dispute whether the public hearings
and reconciliation proceedings were, in fact, beneficial to many Sierra
Leoneans. Anthropologist Rosalind Shaw argues, based on her extensive research throughout the country, that many communities had

already engaged in reconciliation in their own way before the TRC's
hearings began and that asking people to publicly recount and relive
their war-time experiences disrupted ongoing efforts to heal and move
on.18 4 Scholar Tim Kelsall, who observed a number of public reconcili-

ation proceedings, questions whether the truth emerged in any clear or
full way, although in some instances the rituals that concluded the
proceedings did, in his view, suggest an opening for some degree of
reconciliation. 185 These scholarly reports highlight the importance of

182. Unlike in East Timor, the mandate of Sierra Leone's commission did not explicitly
create a community reconciliation mechanism. However, the act establishing the TRC did provide
that the commission "may seek assistance from traditional and religious leaders to facilitate its
public sessions and in resolving local conflicts arising from past violations or abuses or in support
of healing and reconciliation." See Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, section 7(2),
available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcact2000.html. Thus, after building relationships with
community leaders, the TRC's hearings in the districts often concluded with symbolic, customary,
and religious healing ceremonies in which perpetrators "came forward to ask their communities
for forgiveness, which was granted by local traditional leaders." Elizabeth M. Evenson, Note, Truth
andJustice in Sierra Leone: CoordinationBetween Commission and Court, 104 CoLUM. L. REv. 730, 763
(2004).
183. WITNESS TO TRUTH, supra note 17, vol. 1, intro., paras. 51-52.
184. ROSALIND SHAW, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, RETHINKING TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS: LESSONS FROM SIERRA LEONE (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/
specialreports/srl30.pdf.
185. Based on his observations, Kelsall questions whether perpetrators presented a fully
truthful account of their role or even whether victims have been willing to tell the whole truth of
their experience. See Tim Kelsall, Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in SierraLeone, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 361, 361 (2005). Nevertheless, he argues
that "the addition of a carefully staged reconciliation ceremony to the proceedings, a ritual that
created an emotionally charged atmosphere that succeeded in moving many of the participants
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understanding the aspirations and cultural traditions of the people
most affected by atrocities in order to design accountability mechanisms that will be responsive and constructive. The mixed reports
regarding the TRC's impact also underscore the continuing need for
careful study of the actual effects of such accountability mechanisms on
the ground.
V.

DOMESTIC APPROACHES TO AccOuNTABILITY AND THE POTENTIAL
IMPACT OF THE ICC

The explicitly hybrid tribunals established in Sierra Leone and East
Timor, coupled with truth and reconciliation commissions, have not
proven possible in many other situations. Rwanda, disappointed that
the ICTR was located elsewhere, has tried thousands of individuals for
genocide and related crimes before its under-resourced domestic
courts. It also has begun to try large numbers of people in a communitybased process that builds upon traditional dispute settlement practices
known as gacaca.186 Indonesia largely insisted on handling cases arising
out of the violence in East Timor on its own in a special domestic ad
hoc human rights court, but a lack of political commitment ultimately
undermined these efforts, yielding no effective accountability in the
1 87
Indonesian domestic courts for the atrocities in East Timor.
Domestic prosecutions, if they are conducted in a credible manner
that is widely viewed as legitimate and fair, can help demonstrate
accountability in a very direct way to domestic audiences. But an
unwillingness to pursue accountability in a serious and balanced way, a
lack of resources, or both, can undermine these domestic efforts.

and spectators... arguably opened an avenue for reconciliation" in a number of communities. Id.
at 363.
186. For a discussion of both the potential benefits and due process concerns raised by the
gacaca proceedings, see Strain & Keyes, supra note 21, at 117-22; Maya Goldstein-Bolocan,
Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in TransitionalJustice, 2004 J. Disp. REsOL. 355 (2004). As the
process has unfolded, suicide has increased among suspected perpetrators. Craig Timberg, In
Rwanda, Suicides Haunt SearchforJustice and Closure,WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2006, at Al.
187. See Commission of Experts Report, supra note 53, at 38-80. Early on, when international
pressure was stronger, Indonesia did take some initial positive steps toward accountability,
including an investigation and report by a national commission of inquiry, KPP-HAM. Laura A.
Dickinson, The Dance of Complementarity: Relationships among Domestic, International, and TransnationalAccountabilityMechanisms in East Timor and Indonesia,in AccoUNTAILry FOR ATRocmss, supra
note 13, at 332-35, 352, 358-60. Although the terms of reference for the Commission of Truth
and Friendship established by Indonesia and East Timor indicate a clear focus away from criminal
prosecution, paragraph 8 states that the "unprecedented judicial process" in Indonesia "has not
yet come to its completion." Terms of Reference, supranote 126.
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International assistance-and pressure-may be critical to bolster both
domestic will and capacity. Even so, the ability of outsiders to ensure
complete fairness in the conduct of domestic proceedings is likely to be
limited, as the Iraq experience suggests.
A.

Iraq's Special Tribunal: Trying Saddam Hussein

Iraq tried Saddam Hussein and others accused of serious crimes
before the Iraqi Special Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanity, which
was established for this purpose;1 88 trials before the tribunal are
ongoing. Iraqis serve as the tribunal'sjudges and prosecutors, although
the Iraqi government can, "if it deems necessary," appoint non-Iraqis to
serve as judges as well.18 9 The tribunal's statute requires the appointment of international experts to serve as advisors or observers "to
provide assistance to the judges with respect to international law and
the experience of similar tribunals.., and to monitor the protection
by the Tribunal of general due process of law standards."1 90 International advisors also assist investigators and prosecutors.1 9 1 American
lawyers have worked closely with Iraqis, for instance, in reviewing and
preparing evidence, but European and UN officials generally have

188. The Iraqi Governing Council, working closely with the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA), in December 2003 issued a statute creating the Iraqi Special Tribunal for Crimes
Against Humanity ("Tribunal"), availableat http://www.cpa-iraq.org/humanrights/Statute.htm.
The statute was issued and took effect on December 10, 2003. The elected Iraqi government
reaffirmed the statute in 2005. The tribunal has jurisdiction over Iraqi nationals or residents
accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and certain violations of Iraqi law
(manipulation of the judiciary, waste of national resources and squandering of public assets, and
abuse of position leading to war against an Arab county) committed between July 17, 1968, and
May 1, 2003. Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, Arts. 1, 11-14 (2003), http://www.cpa-iraq.org/
human.rights/Statute.htm. The definitions of the international crimes are taken from the Statute
for the International Criminal Court (ICC), and in interpreting those provisions, "the Trial
Chambers and the Appellate Chamber may resort to the relevant decisions of international courts
or tribunals as persuasive authority for their decisions." Id. art. 17(b). Article 35 provides that
"[t] he expenses of the Tribunal shall be borne by the regular budget of the Government of Iraq."
Id. art. 35.
189. Id. art. 4(d). The Tribunal's Trial Chambers consists of five judges. Id. art. 4. The
]
Appeals Chamber consists of nine judges. Id. Article 28 provides that: "[t he judges, investigative
judges, prosecutors and the Director of the Administration Department shall be Iraqi nationals."
Id. art. 28. Article 33 further provides that "No officer, prosecutor, investigative judge, judge or
other personnel of the Tribunal shall have been a member of the Ba'ath Party." Id. art. 33.
190. Id. art. 6(b). Article 6(b) further provides that "[iun appointing such non-Iraqi experts,
the President of the Tribunal shall be entitled to request assistance from the international
community, including the United Nations." Id. art. 6(b).
191. Id. arts. 7(n), 80).
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declined to assist, largely because they oppose the tribunal's authority
to impose the death penalty. 192 Many human rights groups also criticized the failure to create an international tribunal for Iraq or1at93least a
hybrid court with more substantial international participation.
Iraqi leaders, however, wanted a largely domestic process.19 4 Some
no doubt hoped that an essentially domestic tribunal would allow for
prosecutions that Iraqis would view as more legitimate than trials
before an explicitly hybrid court in which international jurists played a
major and visible role. Iraqi leaders emphasized the importance of
bringing Saddam Hussein to justice in order to "heal[] the wounds" in
Iraqi society, 195 and large numbers of Iraqis from families and groups
victimized by his regime followed the trials with great interest. But the
tribunal has faced extraordinary obstacles from the start: several defense counsel were murdered; the presiding judge stepped down and
was replaced by ajudge initially contested by the defense; and Saddam
Hussein stridently mocked and challenged the court's authority. The
trial of Saddam and other defendants accused of the torture and
murder of 148 Iraqi men and boys in the town of Dujail following a
1982 assassination attempt was marked by turmoil since it began. The
proceedings took on a more sober tone after the court affirmed that
the defendants would face charges for crimes against humanity, which
carried a possible death sentence.19 6 Saddam and two co-defendants
ultimately were sentenced to death in the Dujail case for crimes
against
1 97
humanity, and the tribunal upheld this judgment on appeal.

192. Marlise Simons, IraqisNot Ready for Trials; U.N. to Withhold Training,N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 22,

2004, at A1.
193. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Saddam Hussein's Trial: BringingJusticefor the Human
Rights Crimes in Iraq's Past, Dec. 2003, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/12/19/
Iraq6770.htm; Kenneth Roth, Try Saddam in an International Court, Dec. 15, 2003, available at

http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/12/15/iraq12973.htm; Press Release, Human Rights First,
Iraq Special Tribunal Could Bring More Stability: Challenges to Tribunal's Legitimacy Must Be
Faced (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2003_alerts/
1212.htm.
194. Susan Sachs, The Prosecution of a Dictator: A Decade's Digging is Already Done, N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 17, 2003, at A24; Peter Landesman, Who v. Saddam, N.Y. Timars MAG.,July 11, 2004, at 34. An
Iraqi-led rather than an international tribunal was also supported by the Bush Administration.
Landesman, supra,at 38.
195. John F. Bums, For Hussein,A SpartanLife at His FormerPalace, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 19, 2004,

at 1, 6 (quoting human rights minister Bakhtiar Amin: "Withoutjustice, I don't see any possibility
of healing the wounds in this society.").
196. John F. Bums, Surprise: Hussein Acts as if le's on Trial,N.Y. TImEs, May 21, 2006, at 3.
197. For an English translation of the judgment, see http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/
(follow "English Translation of the Dujail Judgment, Dec. 2006" hyperlink). For an English
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The controversial circumstances surrounding Saddam Hussein's execution on December 30, 2006 marred the potential demonstration
effects of his conviction and punishment. To be sure, Saddam's trial in
the Dujail case, problems notwithstanding, afforded him far more due
process than the victims of his cruel tyranny and brutal atrocities ever
received. Yet the failure to complete his trial for the 1988 Anfal
campaign against the Kurds and for other horrific offenses deprived his
victims of a chance to see him held directly accountable for those
atrocities. 198 Also, the circumstances of his rushed execution at the
beginning of a Muslim holiday, Id al-Adha, and the taunting and
epithets that preceded his hanging, made the punishment, in Thomas
Friedman's words, "resemble[] a tribal revenge ritual rather than the
culmination of a constitutional process in which America should be
proud to have participated." 19 9 Although Saddam's execution inevitably would have triggered strong-and conflicting-emotions among
different segments of Iraq's population, the particular circumstances of
his final moments certainly undercut the demonstration effects of what
many hoped would be a "considered act of 21st century official justice"
holding a brutal dictator to account. 200 Moreover, while some domestic
capacity-building has no doubt occurred at the tribunal-with domestic judges and lawyers playing central roles-the problems, tensions,
and difficulties in the proceedings thus far show the enormous and
continuing obstacles of sectarian violence and disillusionment facing
Iraq'sjustice system.
At this point, it remains to be seen whether the prosecutions of other
major figures before the Special Tribunal will be conducted in a fair
and credible manner, 20 1 and whether the proceedings will have, on

translation of the appellate decision in the Dujail case, see http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/
(follow "Unofficial English Translation of the Dujail Trial IHT Appellate chamber opinion"
hyperlink). Other defendants convicted of crimes against humanity in the Dujail case were
sentenced to jail terms for their crimes. http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/ (follow "Unofficial English Translation of the Dujail Trial IHT Appellate chamber opinion" hyperlink).
198. In the Anfal case, chilling tape recordings of Saddam Hussein "justifying the use of
chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds in the late 1980s" and predicting that thousands would
be killed were played in the courtroom when the trial resumed after his execution.John F. Burns,

Hussein's Voice Speaks in Court In Praiseof ChemicalAtrocities,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at Al.
199. Thomas L. Friedman, A HangingandA Funera4 N.Y. TIME,Jan. 3, 2007, at A23.
200. Id. (quoting John Simpson of the BBC). For a discussion of reactions to Saddam's
execution in the region, see Hassan M. Fattah, HangingImages Make Hussein a Martyr to Many in
Arab Worl N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 6, 2007, at Al.
201. The statute of the tribunal affirms fundamental due process rights of the accused,

including the presumption of innocence. Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, Art. 20 (2003).
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balance, a positive domestic impact. Furthermore, as instability, sectarian violence, and insurgency continue to wrack so much of the country,
new atrocities-murders, kidnapping, torture, rape-are perpetrated
with impunity on a daily basis, undermining prospects for a stable rule
of law built on a reliable system of accountability. Instead, a spiral of
violence and impunity is profoundly eroding public confidence in the
rule of law in much of Iraq, overshadowing the significance and
potential impact of the continuing proceedings before the Special
Tribunal.
B.

Afghanistan: Evolving Prospectsfor Accountability

In Afghanistan, the public has expressed strong support for accountability processes that can remove from power those who have committed serious human rights abuses.20 2 Criminal trials for the most serious
offenders accompanied by vetting and removal from power of lesser
offenders are cited by many Afghans as essential to stability, security,
and public trust in the rule of law. Afghanistan's government has shown
more ambivalence about this path-not surprising when some of those
who wield power, including in Afghanistan's parliament, are among
those widely viewed as responsible for serious human rights abuses.2 °3
The Karzai government took an important step forward in December
2005, however, when it adopted a five-point plan for accountability.
Although the issue of criminal prosecution was finessed at that time,
the government affirmed that "no amnesty will be granted for gross
violations of human rights."20 4 Moreover, drawing on an action plan
developed by Afghan officials and the Afghan Independent Human

That article explicitly affirms the right of the accused "to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing" and "to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case
where the interests ofjustice so require." Id. art. 20(d) (4). It also provides that the "accused is
entitled to have non-Iraqi legal representation, so long as the principal lawyer of such accused is
Iraqi." Id. art. 20(d) (2). As of mid-September 2004, "the tribunal ha[d] found no Iraqi lawyers to
defend Mr. Hussein and his associates." Burns, supra note 195, at 6. Subsequently, Hussein's
primary defense counsel was Baghdad-based Khalil Dulaimi, though his trial was marked by
turmoil since it began in 2005. See, e.g., Jamal Halaby, Saddam Lawyer: U.S. Blocking Meeting,
AssOCIATED PREss, Feb. 5, 2006; Sabrina Tavernise, Hussein Trial Resumes, But He Stays Away, N.Y.

TIMm, Feb. 2, 2006, at Al0.
202. See A CallforJustice, supra note 9, at 17-21, 27-29, 34, 46-47 (reporting on the surveys
and focus groups conducted by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)).
203. See Afghanistan:Where's theJustice, ECONOST, Jan. 21, 2006, at 42.
204. Press Release, Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, Truth-seeking and
Reconciliation in Afghanistan (Dec. 15, 2005), availableat http://www.unama-afg.org/news/_pr/
_english/Others/2005/05Dec5%20-%20AIHRC.doc.
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Rights Commission, with international and UN support, the government adopted a five-part strategy for peace, justice, and reconciliation
in Afghanistan. The plan included measures to tangibly acknowledge
and commemorate the suffering of the Afghan people during the long
period of civil war; measures to increase public confidence in state
institutions through fair and transparent vetting procedures and institutional reform; development of a truth-seeking mechanism, after
fuller consideration of the potential contours of such an effort; exploration of measures to promote reconciliation and national unity; and
strengthening of Afghanistan's criminal justice system, along with an
affirmation that amnesty will not be granted for gross human rights
violations.2 °5
The challenge, of course, will be how seriously these goals are
pursued, and whether major offenders are ever held accountable and
removed from positions of power and intimidation. These are hard
issues that will depend on the commitment and priorities of Afghanistan's leaders, in both government and civil society, on international
support for accountability, and on the success of gradual efforts to
extend governmental authority to remote areas of Afghanistan where
local commanders and warlords still operate largely with impunity.
In March 2007, the government adopted a controversial new amnesty law, the implications of which are not completely clear.20 6 The
law appears to shield "belligerent groups" who fought during the
decades-long conflict from being "pursued legally or judicially" by the
government. 20 7 But President Karzai has stressed that the amended law
also "safeguards the victim's rights and punishment of an individual

205. Id. The government-adopted plan was based on a plan developed by the Government of
Afghanistan together with the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission with assistance
from the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan. See GOV'T OF AFGHANISTAN, ET AL., PEACE,
RECONCILIATION, AND JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN,

REPUBLIC

OF AFGHANISTAN

(2005),

ACTION PLAN OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC

available at http://www.aihrc.org.af/tj-actionplan-

19_dec_05.htm. The issue of criminal prosecutions-and the question of a possible hybrid
tribunal for this purpose-was not addressed directly by the government in adopting its five-part
plan. The AIHRC survey found considerable support among the Afghan population for a hybrid
tribunal within Afghanistan. See A CallforJustice,supra note 9, at 24-26.

206. Ron Synovitz, Afghanistan:Amnesty Law Draws Criticism,Praise,RADIO FREE EuROPE/RADIO
LIBERTY, Mar. 14,2007, availableathttp://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/03/69572C45-D2324FC4-B4BE-A5DE9F9FB97C.html; Amnesty Bill Clears Hurdle in Kabul, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007;
Amnesty Bill toAllow War Cimes Trials,WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2007, atA21.

207. An earlier version of the law is available at http/www.aihrc.org.af/charternational_
reconcilation.htm. For analysis, see http://thecenturyfoundation.typepad.com/aw/2007/03/
barnettrubinr.html. Subsequently, President Karzai made amendments to the bill before it was
re-passed. See Synovitz, supranote 206 (discussing revised bill).

[Vol. 38

PURSUING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES AFTER CONFLICT

who committed crimes against an individual." 20 8 What is clear is that
many of Afghanistan's citizens regard meaningful accountability for
abuses-past and present-as critical to their trust and confidence in
the country's developing legal and political institutions. Demonstrating
accountability, in short, although complicated and difficult, is an
integral part of moving forward to build the rule of law.
C.

The PotentialImpact of the ICC

Most of the conflicts discussed in this Article took place before the
International Criminal Court (ICC) was up and running.20 9 In future
conflicts, however, the ICC may have some leverage in encouraging
credible national investigations and prosecutions of major atrocities.
The ICC is designed explicitly to complement and encourage domestic
legal action-not replace it. The Court will have jurisdiction over
individuals accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war
crimes only if states with jurisdiction are "unable or unwilling" ".genuinely" to investigate or prosecute these cases. 21 0 The primacy of nationaljurisdiction-and the principle that the ICC is to be complementary to, not a substitute for, national action-reflects a realist core at the
heart of the ICC statute: awareness that effective national action,
including domestic political will and capacity, is an essential component of lasting accountability. The ICC does, however, provide a
potential check-and ajudicial forum-if domestic action falls short.

208. Amnesty Bill Clears Hurdle in Kabul supra note 206 (quoting President Karzai).The

amended bill provides that the amnesty "shall not affect individuals'. . . criminal or civil claims
against persons with respect to individual crimes;" but, under current circumstances, victims are
unlikely to step forward and bring claims in the absence of support from the state. J. Alexander
Thier & Scott Worden, Op-Ed, Path to Peace,Justice in Afghanistan, CHIsIAN ScI. MON., Mar. 13,
2007, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0313/p09s02-coop.html.

209. Thejurisdiction of the ICC took effect onJuly 1. 2002. This discussion of the ICC draws
directly on Stromseth, supranote 13, at 3-4, 26-32, 36.
210. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9*, 37 I.L.M. 999. Under the complementarity provisions of the ICC, a case is
inadmissible if a state with jurisdiction has genuinely investigated the matter and prosecuted or
made a good faith determination not to prosecute. States wishing to avoid ICCjurisdiction under
the Rome Statute thus can take steps to ensure that they are able and willing to investigate and, if
appropriate, to prosecute individuals domestically for ICC crimes. So ideally the impulses of
sovereignty should combine with the prospect of international action to produce more effective
national accountability efforts. For discussions of complementarity, see generally Michael A.
Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the
InternationalCriminal Court, 167 Mn.. L. REv. 20 (2001); DavidJ. Scheffer, Fourteenth Waldemar A.
Solf Lecture in InternationalLaw: A Negotiator'sPerspective on the InternationalCriminalCourt, 167 MIL.

L. REv. 1, 10-11 (2001).
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In principle, the threat of possible ICC prosecution can help to prod
and encourage responsible domestic investigation and prosecution of
atrocities. Many states already have adapted their domestic criminal law
to provide for national prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. This may be the ICC's most significant impact to
date on strengthening domestic rule of law. In practice, however, the
effectiveness of the ICC's prodding abilities will depend on the court's
own credibility and legitimacy-and on domestic will and capacity in
particular states.
Domestic reformers may sometimes welcome the threat of international action as a means to spur and support their own indigenous
efforts.2"' But "there is a fine line between pressure that strengthens
the hand of internal reformers and pressure that results in greater
domestic resistance to perceived foreign interference. ' 212 Also, domestic reformers must be in a position to translate international pressure
into influence and effective national action. Even when there is domestic will to prosecute and to prevent atrocities, national capacity to do so
effectively may be sorely lacking.
Gaps will exist, in any event, in the ICC's ability to serve as a lever to
prod and encourage responsible domestic accountability processes.
Many of the worst atrocities in recent memory occurred during internal
conflicts. When perpetrators of atrocities come from the state on whose
territory the crimes occurred, the ICC will be in a position to assert
jurisdiction only if that state is a party to the ICC statute or otherwise
21 Thus, many situations of internal conflict in which atrociconsents. 213
ties occur may not be amenable to the ICC's prodding function. In
addition, atrocities committed before the ICC'sjurisdiction took effect
on July 1, 2002, will not be subject to prosecution before the Court.
Thus, the necessity of mechanisms and initiatives to encourage
effective domestic accountability will persist. States will continue to
differ profoundly in their willingness and capacity to hold individuals
accountable for atrocities and take effective measures to prevent future
atrocities. Different methods of strengthening and reinforcing domestic capacity-and different combinations of mechanisms and of national and international roles-will be needed, moreover, in response

211. SeeDickinson, supra note 187, at 358-65.
212. Id. at 372. As in Indonesia, internal reformers can play the "nationalist card" in
encouraging domestic accountability processes as an alternative to international action, but those
resisting reform can do so as well.
213. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9*, 37 I.L.M. 999.
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to the particular goals, needs, and specific circumstances of states in
the aftermath of atrocities. Finding an optimal relationship between
domestic and international actors will not be easy in many cases, but
the need for innovative hybrid accountability mechanisms will continue.2 14
CONCLUSION

To revisit this Article's basic question: can the pursuit of accountability for atrocities through criminal prosecutions and other methods
help to build the rule of law and strengthen domestic justice systems in
post-conflict societies? The answer is "yes, but." As argued here, accountability processes clearly are having a positive impact in a number of
societies, but the effects of these efforts on domestic rule of law have
been mixed, complex, and often unclear, and more research is needed
to fully understand their longer-term impact.
Whether accountability processes have helped to strengthen the rule
of law domestically depends, in part, on their demonstration effects
and their capacity-building impact. On the positive side, criminal trials
of major perpetrators can help disempower destructive actors and, if
widely viewed as fair, can demonstrate that even leaders with political
and economic clout are not above the law and that pervasive impunity
for serious atrocities will no longer be tolerated. Trials can also provide
some solace to victims or their families and help to remove impunity as
a source of grievance more broadly. But if trials are seen as biased, they
can have negative demonstration effects, reinforcing rather than diluting skepticism that law can be fair and reinforcing grounds for grievance. On the issue of capacity-building, an infusion of international
resources can have positive effects, especially in hybrid tribunal arrangements that provide valuable direct experience to participating judges,
prosecutors, investigators, defense counsel, and other staff, many of
whom may then contribute to the domestic legal system. But, in the
case of purely international tribunals, about two billon dollars have
been spent with little discernible impact on domestic capacity-building.
More specifically:
- The ICTY and the ICTR have accomplished a great deal in terms of
bringing to justice, in fair legal proceedings, individuals accused of

214. For a discussion of potential national and international roles and relationships in the
pursuit of accountability, see Kritz, Comingto Terms with Atrocities, supranote 13, at 144-52; Turner,
supra note 20; Stromseth, supranote 13, at 26-36. For a cautionary account of the potential pitfalls
of national efforts, see BAss, supra note 15, at 304-10.
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major atrocities. Nevertheless, these tribunals have had only a limited impact on demonstrating the importance of accountability and
fair justice to critical domestic audiences or on helping to build
capacity in the relevant national justice systems. With earlier and
more effective outreach to local populations and more systematic
capacity-building programs, these tribunals could have accomplished much more. They still have an opportunity to make a greater
domestic impact if their completion strategies focus more attention
and resources on the systematic strengthening of domestic capacities
to handle complex war crimes cases.
• Even the hybrid tribunals have struggled to realize in practice their
theoretical potential. By combining national and international staff
and operating in the country that directly experienced the atrocities,
hybrids-in principle at least-offer important benefits. But if they
are not given adequate resources and support, hybrid arrangements
may fall short of satisfying standards of legitimacy and credibility
among international and domestic audiences alike. At a practical
level, language barriers and less-than-systematic efforts at crossfertilization and training can limit the prospects for genuine capacitybuilding. Kosovo's hybrid arrangement has suffered from a lack of
legitimacy among domestic audiences. In East Timor, the hybrid
tribunal's contributions both in accountability and capacity-building
were constrained significantly by limited resources and by lack of
political support.
- If they are designed and implemented well, however, hybrid tribunals can have significant, positive domestic effects. As the experience
in Sierra Leone suggests, hybrid tribunals can pursue accountability
fairly and credibly while strengthening local capacity and reaching
out systematically to local populations. The longer-term impact of
the Special Court's work remains to be seen, especially the impact of
the trial of Charles Taylor. Although more remains to be done, the
Special Court and its innovative outreach program have strengthened public awareness of the importance of accountability and
contributed to domestic capacity-building.
• Still, criminal trials alone, even with ambitious outreach programs,
are-at best-only part of what is needed to grapple with past
atrocities or to build local capacity forjustice. Combined approaches
that also include truth and reconciliation mechanisms are more
likely to produce more effective and far-reaching demonstration
effects and capacity-building than trials alone. The truth and reconciliation commissions in East Timor and Sierra Leone-which operated contemporaneously with the hybrid criminal tribunals-played
[Vol. 38

PURSUING A CCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES AFTER CONFLICT

a critical role in addressing the larger factors that led to atrocities,
reaching out to victims, and recommending systemic reforms.
- Particularly in post-conflict societies where formal justice systems
have limited geographic reach, community-based accountability proceedings that both enjoy local legitimacy and respect human rights
can have an important immediate impact and also contribute to the
longer-term goal of strengthening the rule of law. East Timor's
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, in particular,
has made a difference in rural areas with limited access to formal
justice: the commission's innovative reconciliation procedures have
helped integrate individuals back into their communities, and the
commission's deliberate effort to involve women and young people
alongside traditional community leaders helped cultivate some potential new leaders.
This exploration of the links between accountability processes for
past atrocities and forward-looking rule of law reform leads me to offer
two final thoughts. First, more research is needed on the impact of
accountability proceedings in different post-conflict societies. Seeking
justice by holding major perpetrators legally accountable, of course,
can and should be pursued as a matter of principle. Yet knowing more
about the impact of different kinds of accountability mechanisms can
help in designing approaches that can seek justice fairly and also
contribute more effectively to building the rule of law domestically and
to strengthening justice systems in post-conflict societies.
Second, international actors involved in designing accountability
processes need to be both more bold and more humble at the same
time. They need to be bolder in working to link accountability proceedings more clearly to longer-term efforts to build domestic capacity for
the rule of law. Accountability processes should not be simply an
endeavor totally apart from ongoing processes of reform: fair justice
can be provided while also working to engage in innovative outreach to
local communities, to build local legal capacity, and to develop synergies with local NGOs. Vision, energy, and resources are required to
press ahead on multiple fronts.
Yet, international actors also need to show more humility and
modesty regarding the ability of accountability processes to bind up the
wounds of those who have suffered atrocities. The needs and aspirations of the people who endured the atrocities must be appreciated
more fully, and their goals must be given greater attention in designing
accountability efforts. Meaningful accountability for atrocities takes
time, and communities may in fact need to move forward for awhile
before they can effectively look backward. Furthermore, claiming too
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much for accountability processes alone in meeting the often complex
expectations of local communities can lead to deep disappointment.
Even the fairest and most credible trials of those responsible for severe
atrocities, the most systematic efforts at judicial capacity-building, or
the best-designed reconciliation procedures will have only a limited
long-term impact if the deeper cultural underpinnings of the rule of
law-and the deeper obstacles to strengthening the rule of law in
particular post-conflict societies-are not understood or addressed
more effectively.
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